Why Metaphysics and Morality?

Abstract

Commonsensically, we think we know many moral truths—that rape is wrong, that it is praiseworthy to return kindness with kindness, etc. Moral skeptics disagree. Epistemic moral skeptics think that even if there are moral truths, we can’t know them; metaphysical moral skeptics think that there is nothing to know—at least no “objective” moral truths. This book deals with metaphysical moral skepticism. Commonsense morality is committed to objective moral truths and facts, but many metaethical theories deny that there is any such thing e.g., moral relativism, moral nihilism, moral-noncognitivism. A broad outline of the theoretical foundation of commonsense morality, viz., moral realism, is provided in preparation for a full-scale rebuttal of metaphysical moral skepticism.