Why Is Biological Teleology Non-constitutive (Merely Regulative) for Kant?

Abstract

There is no doubt that Kant assigns a merely regulative function to biological teleology. But the reasons for Kant’s doing so are less clear. For some Kant scholars, Kant does so because, for him, the concept of natural purpose amounts at best to a subjective maxim of certain heuristic values. Appealing as it is, this view runs into difficulties when other Kant scholars note that Kant takes biological teleology to be indispensable and uses the natural purpose concept to identify biological organisms (or, more precisely speaking, formative powers). I argue that Kant treats biological teleology as non-constitutive (i.e., merely regulative), because the concept of natural purpose is not associated with any supporting laws (biological organisms as instances or particulars of the concept of natural purpose are given, but the concept itself as a universal is only assumed).