Why do Parties Select Non-Partisan Ministers? The Paradox of Ministerial Selection in Austria

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article seeks to contribute to the bourgeoning debate about technocratic, non-political and non-partisan ministers in party government regimes. At the centre of this study is the identification and analysis of a major paradox – a sizeable number and share of non-partisan ministers operating at the core of an otherwise exceptionally party-centered regime, the Second Austrian Republic, which has widely been considered to mark the epitome of the party state in Europe. The discussion of this phenomenon highlights the importance of particular strategic considerations among political decision-makers that have been largely ignored in the extant literature on ministerial selection and de-selection. We argue that in contexts marked by advanced levels of anti-party sentiment, non-partisan ministers can bring major benefit to the government in terms of legitimacy, popularity and support, and at a rather low cost or risk. As they tend to have few if any party resources of their own, non-partisan ministers can be easily removed whenever deemed politically expedient.