Abstract
This paper shows that in a duopoly model of international market competition, threatened imposition of countervailing duties by a domestic country generally deters a foreign country from subsidizing its exports to the former. To explain the coexistence of export subsidization and the GATT-conform countervailing duty measures, factors such as delay in retaliation, the GATT constraint on the amount of countervailing duties, and voluntary export restraints must be considered. We find that these factors lessen the efficacy of countervailing duty retaliation and therefore fail to deter export subsidization.
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