Abstract

The current paper reveals the macroeconomic determinants of material injury decisions on countervailing duties, which have seldom been analyzed. The empirical evidence of the behavior of the US International Trade Commission for the period 1980 - 2010 shows that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between affirmative injury decisions and macroeconomic variables such as the unemployment rate and the import penetration ratio. The error-correction models show that the unemployment rate causes affirmative decisions on countervailing duties. The dummy variable representing the effect of expiration in 1992 of the multilateral voluntary export restraint (VER) in the steel industry is revealed to be significant, while the operation of the WTO system is not shown to be significant.

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