Why Behavioral IR?

Abstract

Research in political science and IR has pointed out numerous anomalies from the traditional analytic, rational, expected utility model of choice (see Jervis 1976; Maoz 1990; Vertzberger 1990; Levy 1997, 2003). Examples of such biases and anomalies include: 1. the susceptibility of leaders, advisors, and other decision makers to framing effects (Levy 1997); 2. the susceptibility of leaders to negative political information, the so-called “poliheuristic bias” (Mintz 2004a); 3. the effect of emotions on information search and preference reversal (Geva and Skorick 2006; Redlawsk and Civettini 2006); 4. the effect of political loss aversion on foreign policy behavior (Jervis 1976; Nincic 1997); 5. the “wishful thinking” bias (Levy 2003); 6. the “shooting from the hip” bias (Forman and Selly 2001); 7. groupthink (Janis 1982). One of the main problems that state leaders encounter in crises is that they tend to be influenced by biases and errors in decision making because of cognitive limitations. In fact, decision making in most complex, crucial policy decisions is affected by such constraints (Forman and Selly 2001). It is well documented that in many instances leaders use rules of thumb, not strictly rational analyses, and often make less than perfect (that is, suboptimal) decisions. It is the proposal of this essay and Forum that Behavioral IR increases the explanatory power of the field of IR by providing it with more realistic psychological foundations.2 The behavior of people, leaders, groups, nations, bureaucracies, and organizations matters in IR and foreign policy (Mintz 2005a). Indeed, IR research can be viewed as consisting of rational choice and nonrational choice (behavioral) paradigms. Behavioral IR is process-oriented, quasi-rational, involves “satisficing,” and the study of framing, all in a bounded rational environment. Prospect theory is an example of a behavioral theory, as is poliheuristic theory. …