Whose firm? Resilience of the German corporate sector to financialization

Abstract

Abstract We examine how financialization has progressed in the German nonfinancial corporate sector since the 2000s. Using a sample of firms historically listed in the largest German stock market indices, DAX and MDAX, we not only confirm the rise of international passive asset managers but also find a growing prevalence of controlling business families. Although executive pay increasingly consists of equity grants, indicating growing shareholder value orientation, we do not identify corporate financialization in terms of rising share buybacks and payout rates. Instead, ever larger shares of corporate funds are kept inside firms as retained earnings. While firms in the USA ‘downsize-and-distribute’ under the pressure of institutional investors, we hold that German firms ‘save-and-sit-on-it’. Although shaped by the liberalization of corporate governance regulations, this regime still relies on blockholdings and codetermination, while integrating asset managers as new providers of patient capital.