Abstract
Providing a theological assessment of whole brain emulation, also called “uploading,” I argue that there is no insurmountable theological objection to the idea that uploading can transfer and preserve personal identity. However, from a philosophical perspective, the duplication argument (a copy cannot be identical to the original) presents a serious problem. So, uploading cannot be viewed as preserving identity, at least until we have an explanation of how uploading can be limited to a single, unique thread of personality. An alternative, which would require theological response, is to treat an upload as a related but not strictly identical person.
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