White supremacy and the racial logic of the global preventing and countering violent extremism agenda

The Kids Are Alt-Right: How Media and the Law Enable White Supremacist Groups to Recruit and Radicalize Emotionally Vulnerable Individuals

Zoom-ing in on White Supremacy

This presentation summarizes a register-based study on women who have been identified as belonging to three violent extremist milieus in Sweden: violent Islamic, violent far-right, and violent far-left extremism. We studied the women in these milieus along a number of analytical dimensions, ranging from demographic and educational to criminal background and network relationships, and compared them to three reference groups: (i) non-extremist biological sisters to female extremists in the study population; (ii) men in the respective extremist milieus; and (iii) female members of other antagonistic milieus such as organized crime. Our results showed that there are both similarities and differences between groups. In some cases, like age and region of birth, there are commonalities between violent far-right and violent far-left women. Regarding region of birth and migration background, women affiliated to violent far-right and violent far-left extremism are predominantly born in Sweden. Women affiliated to violent Islamic extremism tend to be born in Sweden to a greater extent than men in the same milieu, but to a much lesser degree than women in the violent far-right and violent far-left. When it comes to education, women in the violent Islamic milieu are closer to women in violent far-right extremism. Women in violent far-left extremism perform best at school, with consistently higher grades. The average score of women in violent far-left extremism is identical to that of their sisters, and women in violent far-left extremism perform on average substantially better than men in the same milieu. Women in violent Islamic extremism, in contrast, perform on average similarly to men in violent far-left extremism, and they perform better than their biological sisters. Regarding labor market attachment, violent Islamic extremists have the weakest attachment and the highest dependency upon financial assistance as well as a low employment share (36 percent in 2016), but also a relatively high share of individuals with a high number of unemployment days, suggesting that women in violent Islamic extremism experience higher social exclusion. We find the highest employment share among women in violent far-left extremism, where 89 percent are gainfully employed in 2016 (80 percent for at least three of the last five years) and about a 20 percent unemployment share. Men in violent far-left extremism have an employment share around 10 percent below that of the women in far-left extremism for 2016. The highest fractions of individuals that have not been in contact with the health system due to mental disorders are among violent Islamic extremism, with the women’s fraction at 84 percent, compared to their non-extremist sisters and men in the same milieu that are just above 79 percent. Women in violent far-left extremism have the highest share of in-patient major mental disorders among the extremist milieus (3 percent), higher than men in the same milieu (less than 1 percent) as well as than women and their sisters in the other categories. During the period 2007–2016, 68 percent of individuals in the extremist milieus are covered by the register of suspected individuals. The coverage is substantially higher for men, 72 percent than for women, 43 percent. Compared to their sisters, women in all three milieus are criminally active to a much higher extent. However, women in all three milieus are less criminally active than women in other antagonistic milieus, among whom 67 percent have been suspected at least once. In all three milieus, the share of men with a criminal record is about twice as large as that of women. As far as the gender aspect is concerned, we know that extremist milieus generally have a conservative view of the role of women in society. In our results, this is reflected in the low rates of crime in women compared to men, and relatively marginal positions in the co-offending networks. The fact that women in violent far-left extremism have stronger positions in their networks than the other women in the study population is expected, given that the ideology of this milieu allows for greater equality. This means that women in violent far-left extremism participate more often than, e.g., women in violent far-right extremism, in political actions where violence is common. This pattern of gender roles and criminal involvement also holds concerning women in violent Islamic extremism. This milieu has a more traditional view of the role of women than views among even violent far-right extremists. Women in violent Islamic extremism are less involved in crime and, in particular, violent crime.

Far-right violent extremism is the most pressing form of domestic violent extremism (DVE) facing the United States. While there is a consensus that far-right violent extremism poses a genuine risk to the United States, the relevance of women within far-right violent extremism remains understated and under-researched. The misinformed perceptions about women and their propensities for violence must be acknowledged and rectified to ensure a proper analysis of the state of far-right violent extremism in the United States. The far-right social media platform Gab has been utilized to explore underlying conceptions about women in far-right extremism as well as fill the gap in the perceptions about women’s roles in extremism and violent extremism that are currently held by practitioners. A stronger commitment to the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, a framework that reconceptualizes women within discourses about security, promises to rectify the widely held misconceptions about women’s involvement in far-right violent extremism. By reviewing the conceptual shortcomings of those tasked with protecting against far-right violent extremism, the larger goal of securing the United States and beyond can be realized.

Conspiracy theories, and especially antisemitic conspiracy theories, form a core ideological component of right-wing violent extremism in the United States. This article argues that conspiracy narratives and their psychological antecedents are key to understanding the ideological appeal of right-wing extremist formations such as white supremacist and Christian Identity movements, providing insight into the motivations and behaviors of those individual participants who become sufficiently radicalized to carry out terrorist actions. It is further proposed that standard radicalization models can be enhanced for applications specific to right-wing extremism through an understanding of conspiracy thinking (both antisemitic and otherwise), and that this understanding can assist in addressing the motivated roots of the ideologies that sustain this particular type of violent extremism through a public health approach to counter-radicalization that aims to “inoculate” the public against the cognitive tendencies exemplified in antisemitic con- spiracy theories and in conspiracist culture more generally. The proposed approach would complement existing efforts in a unique way, as it would have the potential not only to improve public security, but also to provide further societal benefits by countering other negative tendencies associated with conspiracy belief (for example, decreased intention to vaccinate). This would provide an exceptional cost versus benefit ratio while supporting existing counter-radicalization programs and leaving them intact.

Currently, White supremacy is the greatest terror threat, domestic or international, for the United States, accounting for 73 percent of domestic terror fatalities between 2009 and 2018. As such, this unique aspect of terrorism demands the attention of not only society but also researchers. The first section of this chapter examines the historical roots of White supremacy and White supremacist violence. The second section examines the underlying ideologies that drive these movements and the violence they engage in. The third section explores many of the White supremacist groups that operate within the United States, organizing them by the group’s motivations such as political influence, religious, or youth culture. The fourth section focuses on the current empirical research on White supremacy, specifically the extent of this violence, entry into these groups, and desistance from White supremacy. The chapter concludes by noting areas for future research on White supremacy and domestic terrorism.

The critical race theory concept of ‘White supremacy’ continues to be a major locus of disagreement between Critical Race Theorists and Marxists regarding both how it operates as a general descriptor of racial power dynamics in the Western world and for its explanatory power in accounting for the multiple forms in which racism manifests. Criticisms of the concept of ‘White supremacy’ from Marxists often point to racisms that exist beyond the Black/White binary, or racism directed at minoritised White groups as counterexamples to explanations of racism that appeal to ‘White supremacy’. Marxists also often point to alternative theoretical constructs such as ‘institutional racism’ and ‘racialisation’ as better descriptions for, and explanations of, racism and the mechanisms that serve in its creation and perpetuation. However, examples of racisms that exist outside of a Black/White binary, or which appeal to the existence of racism directed at people identified as White, do not discredit ‘White supremacy’ as a descriptor or explanation of racism and can easily be accommodated within a framework for understanding racism that is consistent with both critical race theory and Marxism. Moreover, constructs such as ‘racialisation’ and ‘institutional racism’ do not have the theoretical utility of ‘White supremacy’ as characterised within critical race theory .

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Mnogi stručnjaci su imali sumorne prognoze o nasilnom islamističkom ekstremizmu i terorizmu u Srbiji. Sandžak – jugozapadni region Srbije naseljen većinski muslimanskim stanovništvom, čak je nazvan uporištem džihadista, budući da je bio središte za dalje širenje ultrakonzervativnog selefizma iz susedne Bosne u Srbiju, kao i region odakle su vrbovani borci za odlazak na sirijsko ratište. Među najuticajnijim militantnim selefijskim vođama u Beču, koji su imali jake veze sa Islamskom državom, bilo je i pojedinaca iz Sandžaka. Međutim, uprkos ovim predviđanjima i prisustvu faktora i uslova koji podstiču nastanak i širenje ekstremizma, Sandžak se pokazao veoma otpornim na nasilni islamstički ekstremizam. U poređenju sa drugim zemljama Zapadnog Balkana, iz Srbije se relativno mali broj ljudi pridružio militantnim islamističkim grupama u Siriji, njih 49, uključujući i žene i decu. Uz to, u Srbiji je zabeleženo tek nekoliko incidenata i neuspelih terorističkih napada u koje su bili umešani militantni selefije. Lokalna zajednica u Sandžaku pokazala je otpornost na nasilni ekstremizam ali i na širenje ultrakonzervativnog učenja o islamu. U ovom radu najpre opisujemo najvažnije slučajeve i incidente koje su izazvali ekstremisti, a potom mapiramo i analiziramo faktore radikalizacije u Sandžaku. Drugi deo rada posvećen je razumevanju ključnih faktora otpornosti na nasilni ekstremizam u Sandžaku. Desničarski ekstremizam u Srbiji analiziramo u kontekstu recipročne radikalizacije, odnosno samo kao mogući faktor koji podstiče rast islamističkog ekstremizma. Rad je zasnovan na opsežnom terenskom istraživanju u Beogradu, Novom Pazaru, Sjenici i Tutinu, sprovedenom od jula do septembra 2021. godine, tokom koga je obavljeno ukupno 25 intervjua.

Many experts had gloomy forecasts about violent Islamist extremism and terrorism in Serbia. Sanjak - the southwest region in Serbia populated by Muslim majority - was even dubbed Jihadist hotbed, as it was the center for further spreading ultra-conservative Salafism from the neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina into Serbia, and a region where the recruitment of Syrian foreign fighters took place. Among the most influential militant Salafi leaders in Vienna who maintained contacts with ISIS there were individuals from Sanjak. However, despite these forecasts and the presence of both push and pull factors of violent extremism, Sanjak has proved to be very resilient to violent Islamist extremism. Compared to other countries in the Western Balkans, a relatively small number of people from Serbia (49 of them including women and children) joined militant Islamist groups in Syria. Only a few incidents involving militant Salafis and failed terrorist plots happened. People in Sanjak showed both resilience to violent extremism and to the spread of the ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam. In this paper, we first identify the cases of violent extremism and then map and analyze factors that make Sanjak enabling environment for extremism. The second part of the paper is dedicated to understanding key resilience factors to violent extremism showcased in Sanjak. Ethno-nationalism and far-right extremism are only analyzed as possible drivers of Islamist radicalization. This report is based on extensive field research in Belgrade, Novi Pazar, Sjenica, and Tutin between July and September 2021, during which a total of 25 interviews were conducted.

ABSTRACTThis research uses quantitative analyses to determine whether or not conviction outcomes differ across three major American domestic terrorism groups: ecoterrorists, left-wing extremists, and right-wing extremists. Findings suggest that ecoterrorists receive lighter treatment within the criminal justice system while controlling for important variables, such as gender, age, and count severity. Findings highlight differences between “home-grown” terrorist groups, departing from a large segment of terrorism research focused on domestic versus international comparisons or terrorist versus civilian comparisons. Results elicit new research questions to understand why domestic terrorists receive differential treatment within the criminal justice system, despite controlling for key variables.

Academics and policymakers recognize the absence of empirically grounded research to support the suppositions on which terrorist focused policies are based. (Sageman, Marc. 2014. “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research”. Terrorism and Political Violence 26 (4): 565–80) We developed our project, Mapping Networks and Narratives of Online Right-Wing Extremists in New South Wales, (Department of Security Studies and Criminology. 2020. Mapping Networks and Narratives of Online Right-Wing Extremists in New South Wales. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4071472) to illuminate this space. Using the analysis of large-scale online data to generate evidence-based insights into online Right-Wing Extremism (RWE) across the state, our research focused on four key questions: (1) What is the nature of the online RWE environment in New South Wales, Australia (NSW)? (2) How is this movement distributed across NSW? (3) How are themes and narratives framed in different online contexts to mobilize support? (4) What level of risk does the online right-wing environment pose? These questions were left purposely broad to facilitate an exploratory project into what was, in 2018–2019, still a relatively little studied milieu. We combined expertise from computational science, security studies, and behavioral science. We were funded by the Department of Communities and Justice, NSW. We identified two distinct—yet connected—levels of risk. The first was a creeping threat to democracy fueled by networks and content that challenged the fundamental principles of pluralistic liberal democracy. The second was a risk of violence perpetrated by individuals and/or groups that advocate and/or support the use of violence as a tactic to achieve an ideological end. The communities we examined were primarily characterized by networks of individuals as opposed to formal groups. The role played by individual influencers has important ramifications for policy communities: attention should be paid to issues of proscription and moderation. While this milieu engaged with Australian issues and events, it was notably far more obsessed with American issues: particularly those focused on populist narratives and Trumpism. Despite being hateful and extreme, online RWE communities are, firstly, spaces of sociability for users, where social networks are maintained by shared values and norms. For those involved, these spaces engender positive experiences: individuals might share an image of their dinner cooking in their kitchen interspersed with “shitposting” and virulent hate speech. While we identified a variety of narratives that focused on the delegitimization of government and dehumanization of others, the central theme was that of “white identity under threat”. We observed five distinct stages of moderation approach and echo chamber strength. A series of issues for future consideration were identified from the analysis: (1) Awareness raising for key stakeholders across different levels of government and civil society about the revolutionary and anti-social agenda of RWE communities. (2) Building awareness about the civic underpinnings of representative liberal democracy and the threat that RWE poses. (3) Expanding current Countering Violent Extremism infrastructure provided by the NSW government to individuals and communities vulnerable to right wing extremism. (4) The local government is well positioned to deliver programs in rural communities impacted by RWE. (5) Upskilling front-line workers to recognize the risks associated with RWE, and providing pathways into CVE intervention programs for individuals identified as being at-risk.

Historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs) were founded with the principal mission to educate Black people during an era when they were barred from most postsecondary opportunities. Today, these institutions play a vital role in the higher education landscape and help to insure the long-term viability of the U.S. economy. This research explored public discourse regarding HBCU bomb threats during 2022 and how public comments reflected on issues of race(ism), power, intimidation and domestic terrorism as a continuation of historical violence against Black Americans. The authors employed critical content analysis techniques and Critical Race Theory, while examining social media posts from X (formerly known as Twitter) as an innovative data source regarding public dialogue. The findings discuss two overarching themes within public discourse about these campus safety threats—(1) racism and White supremacy; and (2) political (in)action. These findings provide insights concerning perceptions of historical and contemporary racial oppression and terrorism experienced by Black individuals. The findings also highlight discourse concerning the ways in which racism and White supremacy were perpetuated by national political forces and (in)actions. Moreover, the findings reflect the ways in which public discourse situate racism as a norm in the U.S.

The murder of the German politician Walter Lübcke in 2019 by a far-right extremist with links to Neo-Nazi groups exposes the need to address European ethnonationalist extremism from a wider array of approaches, one of them, the religious one. European ethno-nationalists have found profitable the distortion of elements of Western Christianity and its use to reject individuals they consider undesirable, especially Muslims and non-European immigrants. By doing this, far-right extremists have managed to consolidate an ideological basis known as Christianism. This work examines the characteristics of the extremist ideology Christianism and its relation to white supremacism, as well as the historical bias of the Crusades they use and that is a central part of their ideology. This work analyses the manifesto written by white supremacist terrorist Brenton Tarrant with the aim to expose the relation between white supremacism and Christianism, as well as the influence on terrorist acts against non-Europeans in the West, and the main propositions of such extremist ideology. The conclusion proposes the need of better education in history and critical thinking skills in societies affected by white supremacism, as well as the participation of followers of traditional Christianity in counter extremism efforts

While security is hardly discussed in philosophy (as Jonathan Herington, this volume, points out) and while theories of security are politely neglected in law (as Wouter Werner, this volume, shows), it is the preeminent concept in international relations. Courses on security studies are taught in almost all undergraduate/graduate programs in international relations around the globe. There is at least one security specialist (and often, many more) in almost all departments of political science and international studies in North America, Europe, and Asia. Security is the primary focus of no fewer than four major journals in the field – International Security , Security Dialogue , Journal of Conflict Resolution , and Security Studies – and this list is expanding, with the newly created Critical Studies on Security (2013), the European Journal of International Security (2016), and the Journal of Global Security (2016). In the top twelve journals in international relations according to the 2012 Thompson Reuters Citation Journal Report , four are security-related journals. In short, security studies is a massive field of research in international relations. In the past decades, debates surrounding security studies have evolved through several interrelated turns. Security has been structured, systemized, broadened, deepened, gendered, humanized, constructed, and privatized. Theoretical and empirical studies detailing the contours and the importance of each of these approaches to security abound in specialized journals. In this chapter, we want to celebrate this eclectic dynamism. Through our discussion, we will show that the diversification of referent objects, approaches, and research methods is a crucial vector in the development and relevance of security studies. Scholars have organized and reviewed this immense field of study in several ways. Some of the most influential reviews address how the various international relations approaches understand security (Williams 2013), how they distinguish between types of security (Collins 2013), and what are the security problematics (Baldwin 1997). Still others tackle the evolution of international security studies as a field of research (Buzan and Hansen 2009). Although the discussion we offer in this chapter will necessarily be influenced by these important contributions, we have a different set of objectives here.