Abstract

Within contemporary philosophy of religion there are three main ways in which God is conceptualised in relation to personhood:God is a person and so personal (PP).God is non-personal, and so is not a person (NPNP).God is a personal non-person (PNP).The first two of these options will be familiar to many, with (PP) held by most contemporary monotheist philosophers of religion and (NPNP) mainly by those who are pantheists. (PNP), however, is a view some may not have come across, despite its proponents claiming it was the view of great philosophical theologians from the past. However, within recent times (PNP) has become more popular. On the face of it, it might not be clear what the difference between (PP) and (PNP) is, and whether debate had between the two positions is substantive. The goal of this paper is therefore to clarify the debate and assess whether the many claims advocates of (PNP) make as to why God cannot be a person (PP) stand up to scrutiny or are persuasive. My suggestion will be that on the whole they do and are not. As such, defenders of (PNP) will either need to defend these reasons in more detail or focus on the area I suggest the debate really rests on.

Highlights

  • The first two of these options will be familiar to many, with (PP) held by most contemporary monotheist philosophers of religion and (NPNP) mainly by those who are pantheists. (PNP), is a view some may not have come across, despite its proponents claiming it was the view of great philosophical theologians from the past

  • God is timelessly eternal and impassible. Another worry some (PNP)’s give against (PP) is because ‘God is impassible.... (1) God cannot be altered by anything a creature does, and (2) God is intrinsically unchangeable.... this idea suggests that God is outside time.’ (Davies 2004, 5)33 The thought seems to be that a person can be neither of these

  • Person is not to be applied to God.’ (De Potentia Dei, q.9, a.3, obj.3) The reply he gives is, ‘ God is not in the genus of substance as a species, he belongs to the genus of substance as the principle of the genus.’ (De Potentia Dei, q.9, a.3, ad.3)41 As a result, he seems to reject (PNP)s’ reasoning, and as we have already seen, can say that ‘the term person is ascribed to God in its proper sense.’ (De Potentia Dei, q.9, a.3, co.)42 Defenders of (PNP) could either assert that my reading of Aquinas here is wrong, and offer another interpretation, or suggest that Aquinas is wrong here and stand by their claim

Read more

Summary

Person and personal

Before setting out how I think we should answer this question, given what defenders of (PP) have said, let me first lay out what those who defend (PNP) think (PP)’s conception of persons is. It is open to the defender of (PP) to suggest that person means something so distinct from what it originally meant when formulating the Trinity that claiming (PP), using the modern definition of person, cannot be thought to contradict God being three persons, when person in this sense is understood as it was meant originally when termed ‘hypostasis’. Given these responses, this doesn’t seem a good reason to adopt (PNP)

Worries about starting points and results
Creation and conservation ex nihilo
God is timelessly eternal and impassible
God has a different type of being than persons
Divine simplicity
Conclusion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call