Conceptions of Faith

Abstract

This entry focuses on the recent resurgence of discussion of faith in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. One prominent position that perhaps runs contrary to the popular-level view of the matter is that faith does not require belief. This—whether faith requires belief—is one of the most discussed issues in the literature, with some arguing that a different, weaker attitude than belief, such as acceptance or hope, is sufficient for faith. Other alternatives to the belief model of faith include imaginative faith in ultimism, faith as doxastic venture, and faith as trust. Additional topics in this entry include whether faith is consistent with evidentialism or whether it inherently requires a type of irrationality, and finally the degree to which skepticism is consistent with faith. In order to keep this entry a manageable size we will not address historical accounts of faith or those found within the Continental tradition. Additionally, we will not discuss non-Western conceptions of faith; the literature we examine focuses on propositional faith as found in the Judeo-Christian tradition (which is the focus of much contemporary philosophy of religion). Finally, given space constraints we focus on work produced after 2000, with the exception of particularly influential pieces.