Where Ideals Confront Self-interest: Wilsonian Foreign Policy

Abstract

Probably no American of the twentieth century has received more scholarly attention than Woodrow Wilson. As the subject of numerous biographies, including multivolume works, Wilson's reputation has been enhanced through the accessibility of his public and private papers, in excess of two million pieces, which were filmed in their entirety as part of the Library of Congress's presidential papers series. More recently, in what must certainly be one of the monumental events in publishing history, Princeton University Press published an annotated edition of the Wilson papers, sixty-eight volumes, under the general editorship of Arthur S. Link. Link is also the author of a still uncompleted multivolume biography.1 Then, too, the Wilson era has been the focus of literally scores of monographs, books, and articles written by Americans as well as by an increasing number of European and Asian scholars. Perceived solely from the perspective of Wilson's leadership in international politics, this attention is well deserved. His incumbency as American chief executive coincided with the three great national revolutions of this century—in China, Mexico, and Russia. His presidency embraced years of American neutrality, then belligerency, in the world war of 1914–1918, followed by the peace negotiations that culminated in the political struggle at home over ratification of the Versailles treaty with the attached League of Nations covenant. Failure in this final effort to win American acceptance of the peace treaties and American participation in the new international machinery in no way diminishes Wilson's stature. To a remarkable extent, many contentious issues confronting Wilson during the war and later at the Paris Peace Conference would provide a continuing agenda for American statesmen for the balance of the twentieth century.2 What contributes further to the enhancement of his reputation, I believe, is that throughout his presidency, Wilson was subjected to almost incessant political attacks from both the conservative right and the ultraliberal left. Criticism of Wilson's internationalism continued unabated after he left the White House in 1921 and after his death in 1924. Historical revisionists like Harry Elmer Barnes and Charles Tansill charged the Wilson administration, not the German Reich, with responsibility for bringing the United States into the European war in 1917. Later realists like Walter Lippmann, Hans Morgenthau, and George F. Kennan assailed Wilson for his moral idealism and insufficient realpolitik. Such criticism and historical controversies have actually intensified scholarly and public interest in the Wilsonian era and its legacy.