When in Debt, Appoint Women? A Re-Examination of Aid, Debt, and the Inclusion of Women in African Cabinets

Abstract

Abstract Are more aid-dependent and indebted countries more likely to include women in their cabinets? Several studies have suggested that such countries seek to please donors and lenders. Focusing on Africa, we test whether leaders respond to international incentives and, specifically, signal donors and lenders that they value gender equality in political decision-making. Although leaders have more direct control over the gender composition of the cabinet than the legislature, our analyses do not show that aid dependence and indebtedness result in more women in either the cabinet or the legislature. We operationalize aid dependence and indebtedness as a proportion of recipient gross national income, which we argue better reflects the aid and loan recipients’ vulnerability to external pressure. Using regression analysis techniques and multiple robustness checks to evaluate our panel data, our findings remain consistent with arguments that African states have stronger bargaining positions than the foreign aid literature has acknowledged.