When Fulfilling a Professional Obligation Causes Moral Distress: A New Evaluative Approach.

Abstract

The term 'moral distress' was coined by Andrew Jameton to name the anguish that clinicians feel when they cannot pursue what they judge to be right because of institutional constraints. We argue that moral distress in critical care should also be addressed as a function of the constraints of ethics and propose an evaluative approach to the experience considering its implications for professional identity. We build on a selective review of the literature and analyze a paradigmatic example of moral distress, namely, clinicians who feel compelled to perform procedures on patients that seem futile. Such cases are commonly cited by clinicians as among the most morally distressing. Our analysis shows that (1) physicians' experiences of moral distress can stem not only from toxic workplace cultures and institutional constraints on their time and resources for patient care but also from the limits of ethical reasoning and (2) an emotion-based evaluative approach to analyzing moral distress is needed to address its hazards for professional identity. We propose a new evaluative approach to moral distress with implications for professional identity and the need for institutional education and support.