Abstract
The classic hawk-dove game predicts that hawk is an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) when value ( V) is greater than cost ( C). This paper discusses how the hawk-dove game is affected if a hawk can damage a dove, regardless of the dove’s intentions to withdraw from a contest. The ability of a hawk to damage a dove significantly alters the expected payoffs for the participants with hawk now being an ESS when V> C,dependent on the probability of a hawk being able to inflict damage on a dove. If this probability is ≥ 0.5 then hawk is an ESS regardless of the ratio of value to cost. The conditions under which this type of game may actually occur in nature and how the game relates to human interactions are also discussed.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
