What We Talk About When We Talk About US-Russia Strategic Stability

Abstract

ABSTRACT Bilateral strategic stability between the United States and Russia is not a new concept, but it is one that is both evolving and contested. It faces two interrelated challenges that make its operationalization difficult today. First, as Michael Gerson has observed, it has “no single, universally accepted definition”, and there is little agreement on “which factors contribute to and detract from it”. Second, efforts to negotiate US-Russia bilateral arms control and risk reduction measures designed to advance strategic stability can become stymied as a result because negotiators lack a common goal. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine represents an inflection point for strategic stability on several levels. Against the backdrop of the impending expiration of New START and the arrival of what Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala call a third nuclear age, policymakers in Washington and Moscow should seek to reach a shared understanding of what strategic stability is and does as a means to its operationalization. Recognizing the challenges to doing so, particularly in the current environment, this article outlines two-phased approach to strategic stability dialogue that is informed by a philosophy of Pragmatism and translated into policy through mechanisms like backcasting and threatcasting. Its objective is to aid both sides in disambiguating their conceptualization of strategic stability while prioritizing approaches that can strengthen its most desirable outcomes.