Abstract
Naïve Realism claims that veridical perceptual experiences essentially consist in genuine relations between perceivers and mind-independent objects and their features. The contemporary debate in the philosophy of perception has devoted little attention to assessing one of the main motivations to endorse Naïve Realism–namely, that it is the only view which articulates our ‘intuitive’ conception of perception. In this paper, I first clarify in which sense Naïve Realism is supposed to be ‘naïve’. In this respect, I argue that it is put forward as the only view which can take our introspective knowledge of perception at face value, and I identify the two (alleged) key features of such introspective knowledge. Second, I challenge the claim that one of these features-namely, that it seems as one could not be in the same perceptual state unless the putative objects of perception existed and were perceived–is introspectively evident. Consequently, I argue that a view of perceptual experience–such as Intentionalism–which denies that this feature is true of perception can still take introspection at face value. This undermines the claim that Naïve Realism is the only account which accommodates our intuitions on the nature of perception.
Highlights
Naıve Realism claims that veridical perceptual experiences essentially consist in genuine relations between perceivers and mind-independent objects and their features
I focus on question (1) above; in a nutshell, my answer is that the advocates of Naıve Realism refer to it as ‘naıve’ in the sense that it best articulates our introspective knowledge of perception
If we focus on this claim, we can more connect it with the idea of this account being pre-theoretical: Naıve Realism is, allegedly, the best way to account for what introspection reveals to us about perception when it is not influenced by any further theoretical commitment
Summary
If we assume them to be different things, one possible interpretation is that Naıve Realism is taken to represent the best articulation of both This is implausible for at least two reasons: (a) the two ideas are sometimes explicitly presented as connected claims (see, for instance, the passage mentioned above from Martin (2002)); (b) none of the authors above provide different sets of features Naıve Realism articulates, one for our pre-theoretical conception of experience and the other for our introspective knowledge of it: in both cases, the features Naıve Realism accommodates are (T) and (A). The same word ‘common’ refers to the idea of something that is shared between two or more people At this point, one may be tempted to reassign a role to the conception of the ‘common person’ by claiming that Naıve Realism best articulates what she would answer not to a general question about the nature of perception, but to the corresponding phenomenological one—something on the line of ‘what it is like’ to perceive. I show that Intentionalism is not committed to rejecting (I), challenging the claim that only Naıve Realism can take our intuitive conception of perception at face value
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