What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion?

Stéphane Zuber,Michelle Hutchinson,Marcus Pivato,Geir B Asheim,Clinton Castro,Toby Ord,William Macaskill,Marc Fleurbaey,H Orri Stefánsson,John Broome,Nick Beckstead,Kevin Kuruc,Lisa Forsberg,Nicholas Lawson,Tim Campbell,Dean Spears,Jeff Sebo,Diane Coffey,Mark Budolfson,Michal Masny,Katie Steele,Susumu Cato,Torbjörn Tännsjö,Christian Tarsney,Alexander Berger,Johan E Gustafsson,Nikhil Venkatesh,H R G Greaves ,Yew Kwang Ng

doi:10.1017/s095382082100011x

Abstract

The Repugnant Conclusion is an implication of some approaches to population ethics. It states, in Derek Parfit's original formulation, For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living. (Parfit 1984: 388)

Highlights

What we agree on We agree on the following1. The fact that an approach to population ethics (an axiology or a social ordering) entails the Repugnant Conclusion is not sufficient to conclude that the approach
The Repugnant Conclusion is an implication of some approaches to population ethics
What we agree on We agree on the following: 1. The fact that an approach to population ethics entails the Repugnant Conclusion is not sufficient to conclude that the approach

Summary

What we agree on We agree on the following

1. The fact that an approach to population ethics (an axiology or a social ordering) entails the Repugnant Conclusion is not sufficient to conclude that the approach. 2. The fact that the Repugnant Conclusion is implied by many plausible principles of axiology and social welfare is not a reason to doubt the existence or coherence of ethics and value theory ( we do not rule out that there may be other reasons for moral skepticism). We do not here endorse or oppose the Repugnant Conclusion, nor total utilitarianism, nor any specific approach. Our shared claim that avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion is not necessary does not take a position on whether avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion is desirable in evaluating a candidate axiology, social ordering, or approach to population ethics. We do not claim or deny that the Repugnant Conclusion is meaningful or welldefined, nor that a life worth living is well-defined (see Broome 2004 and more detail )

Brief summaries of alternative paths to the claims we agree on

Conclusion