Abstract

AbstractTotal views imply what Derek Parfit has called ‘the repugnant conclusion’. There are several strategies aimed at debunking the intuition that this implication is repugnant. In particular, it goes away when we consider the principle of unrestricted instantiation, according to which any instantiation of the repugnant conclusion must appear repugnant if we should be warranted in relying on it as evidence against total theories. However, there are instantiations of the conclusion where it doesn't seem to be at all repugnant. Hence there is nothing repugnant about the repugnant conclusion as such. The faults with total views have nothing to do with large numbers or with the conclusion as such. It is possible, if you like, to correct these putative faults even if you adopt some total view (different from utilitarianism).

Highlights

  • I turn to some new observations about how to debunk the intuition that the Z world is worse than the A world

  • On this understanding of the perfectionist objection to total hedonistic utilitarianism presupposing that some pleasures are higher than others, we have to accept that in some instantiations the Z world is better than the A world, but in order to reach this conclusion we must take into account the putative fact that higher pleasures carry a heavier moral weight than lower ones, and we must acknowledge that it takes a lot of pleasure to compensate for intense suffering

  • The abstract intuition that the Z world is worse than the A world goes away when exposed to various debunking strategies

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Summary

For better or worse

A note on the words ‘better and worse’ is in order. Since we are here dealing with moral problems (not problems in aesthetics) I take it that the talk about one world being better or worse than another one has normative implications. I will assume that if a world A is better than a world B, and if I can produce one and only one of them, I ought, all other things being equal, to produce A This means that, if I can produce A rather than B without violating any normative constraints (I need not kill innocent beings when I do so, I need not break any promises, and so forth), I ought to produce A rather than B. Such normative implications are what feeds my intuitions in the field

Strong arguments in favour of the repugnant conclusion
Debunking moral intuitions
Some general debunking strategies
The principle of unrestricted instantiation
Conclusion
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