Abstract
Coherence theories of knowledge and justification come in many varieties, but what unites them all is the view that a more coherent set of beliefs is epistemically preferable to a less coherent set of beliefs. We will not question that central claim. What we wish to point out is that coherence, per se, is not truth conducive; that is, we will argue that by increasing the coherence of a set of beliefs, the new, more coherent set of beliefs is often less likely to be true than the original, less coherent set. This is an important result, if one of the desiderata of a theory of epistemic justification is to reveal the connection between justification and truth. Bonjour says:
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