What Makes Pro-poor Public Policy Dysfunctional? Evidence from the Select Public Policies in Odisha, India

Abstract

As a welfare state, India brought many pro-poor reformist public policies and programmes now and then, but some got dysfunctional or produced little outcomes. In this context, this article addresses the issues with implementation by critically examining the land reform legislation, the Other Backword Classes reservation policy and the idea of making Odisha an industrially viable state. It uses a mixed-method research approach and draws on both primary and secondary data. The analysis shows the conflict between an upper caste and feudal-dominated state power and socially marginalised groups over access to and distribution of resources. Thus, it argues that the dysfunctional land reform legislation, under-utilised agriculture and forest resources and the tokenism in OBC reservation policy are embedded with the nature of state power and leadership, posing a conflict of interest in the creation, utilisation and distribution of resources. The study has implications for social development and public policy in India and South Asia.