What, if Anything, is Teleology? The Ambiguous History of "Purpose" in Organizational Thought

Abstract

A central point of departure of social and organizational systems theory from it origins in structural-functional sociology is the idea, drawn from cybernetic theory, that systems are, or may be interpreted as, naturally purposeful. Although the purposeful-or teleologicall" character of systems is typically defended on ostensibly scientific grounds, this paper argues that: (1) teleology has no valid status as a scientific idea, but is instead a quasi-religious, mystical belief disguised in scientific-sounding jargon; (2) the belief that the purposeful character of machine or nature may be inferred from observations of their behavior alone, rather than through reference to ordinary human intention, is logically untenable; (3) as systems theories have used the term, teleology confuses a system "way of viewing" phenomena with an assertion that they concretely exist (i.e., a confusion of an epistemological with an ontological claim), thus rendering a tautological argument that systems are purposeful; (4) by confusing science with metaphysics in their treatment of teleology, systems theorists have made unwarranted and surreptitious normative judgments disguised as scientific truths; and (5) a plausible reinterpretation of modern cybernetics itself suggests compelling reasons for rejecting purposefulness both as an accurate description, as well as a basis for the normative evaluation, of organizational action.