Abstract
Na filosofia analítica contemporânea, enquanto alguns epistemólogos afirmam que a reflexão – entendida como autoexame crítico das crenças – é uma condição necessária para a atribuição de estados epistêmicos valiosos, outros rejeitam essa afirmação e sustentam que os filósofos tendem a superestimar o valor da reflexão em seus relatos de fenômenos epistemológicos. Neste ensaio, apresentamos um breve panorama desse debate e indicamos os elementos que constituem o desacordo entre epistemólogos. Nosso diagnóstico é que, a despeito do radical desacordo, essas posições convergem porque tratam a reflexão de um ponto de vista individualista, uma vez que a definem como uma performance metacognitiva privada de um agente sobre os próprios estados epistêmicos. Além de ser um motivo de desacordo, essa concepção de reflexão pode ser a razão de uma compreensão equivocada dos epistemólogos sobre o lugar e valor da reflexão.
Highlights
This essay presents a broad and critical view of the concept of “reflection” in epistemology
As we said at the beginning, it is likely that the issue that has led to the disagreement over the value of reflection relates to the idea that there should be a criterion for establishing whether a person is an epistemic agent, whether she is justified in believing what she believes and, whether she knows
In this essay we have presented a brief overview of the debate about the place and value of reflection in epistemology
Summary
This essay presents a broad and critical view of the concept of “reflection” in epistemology. In general, epistemologists understand reflection as a metacognitive activity of an individual subject who examines her own beliefs and thoughts according to her own judgment We call this understanding of reflection the individualistic conception of reflection (ICR). After presenting the broad lines of this conception, we will state that the epistemological debate would benefit from understanding reflection as an activity that occurs in the exchange of disagreed beliefs in the dialectical dialogue setting In this scenario, the best thing that epistemic agents should do is to examine their own beliefs in the light of the criticisms and objections of their interlocutors and, in the same way, they should examine the beliefs and statements of their interlocutors. We conclude in the last section with the suggestion that the epistemological debate could benefit from a non-individualistic conception of reflection
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