What Drives Legislatorss Information Behavior? An Eye-Tracking Experiment with Legislators

Abstract

Existing theoretical accounts on legislators’ information behavior are eclectic. In one way or another, these accounts suggest that legislators use or ignore information based on its potential to solve a policy problem or enhance career prospects. We argue that these reasons do not represent triggers strong enough for an individual legislator to engage herself in the cognitive work necessary. Instead, we suggest that legislators have no substantial interest in policy-relevant information until their political intuitions are in conflict and fail to provide orientation. Only then does information search and use behavior precede judgments. If political intuitions are in line, information search and use are employed post hoc and provide arguments for the position that has been reached intuitively. To test the hypotheses that follow from this model on legislators’ information interest, search, and use, we conduct an eye-tracking experiment with 56 legislators. Eye-tracking metrics highlight that if political intuitions are contradicted, legislators’ interest in available information is more intense, their search behavior is less distorted, and available information is used differently during the deliberation process. We conclude that an intuitionist model of information behavior provides more plausible explanations for legislators’ observed information behavior in the political arena.