What Does This Button Do? Departmental Restructurings, Information Processing, and Administrative Errors

Abstract

ABSTRACT In times of political turnover, incoming governments frequently reorganize parts of the central bureaucracy. They not only do so by reshuffling ministerial portfolios, but also by altering the internal design of ministerial departments. This paper problematizes these departmental restructurings from an organizational design perspective, linking them to several unintended consequences or administrative errors. In particular, the theoretical argument notes how some departmental changes increase the likelihood that “errors of omission” will occur (i.e., failing to act on problematic information signals), while other changes lead to “errors of commission” (i.e., acting on the wrong information signals). Theoretically, this paper thus illustrates the importance of changing the formal design for bureaucratic information processing and administrative decision-making. Practically, it demonstrates the implications of too carelessly pressing the buttons of structural design within public organizations.