Abstract
I address options for providing scientific policy advice and explore the relation between scientific knowledge and political, economic and moral values. I argue that such nonepistemic values are essential for establishing the significance of questions and the relevance of evidence, while, on the other hand, such social choices are the prerogative of society. This tension can be resolved by recognizing social values and identifying them as separate premises or as commissions while withholding commitment to them, and by elaborating a plurality of policy packages that envisage the implementation of different social goals. There are limits to upholding the value-free ideal in scientific research. But by following the mentioned strategy, science can give useful policy advice by leaving the value-free ideal largely intact. Such scientific restraint avoids the risk of appearing to illegitimately impose values on the public and could make the advice given more trustworthy.
Highlights
Expertise and scientific policy advice form an essential resource for modern government
Regarding valuejudgments, people interviewed attributed a narrow science-and-technology perspective to experts which was believed to disregard the broader human viewpoint (European Commission 2010; Scientific American 2010; Wissenschaft im Dialog/Kantar Emnid 2017; Carrier 2017). The worry underlying such complaints is that social, value-laden influences on science compromise the epistemic integrity of scientific knowledge
Scientific authority is limited to epistemic matters, while social, political and economic value-judgments are the privilege of social bodies
Summary
Expertise and scientific policy advice form an essential resource for modern government. Virologists and epidemiologists counsel governments on public health policy, independent central banks direct financial politics, and climate scientists frantically struggle to coax governments into taking action This widespread practice of scientific policy advice and expert guidance has prompted two kinds of worries among a wider audience. I will turn to the opposite view advocating value-free science In this approach, scientific authority is limited to epistemic matters, while social, political and economic value-judgments (or nonepistemic value-judgments) are the privilege of social bodies. Legitimate scientific policy advice may expound a diversity of policy packages, each of which is laden with different values, and to leave the choice to politics In this way, scientists could respect crucial features of the value-free ideal and still give useful advice
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