Abstract
Many philosophers agree that Hume was not simply objecting to inductive inferences on the grounds of their logical invalidity and that his description of our inductive behaviour was inadequate, but none the less regard his argument against induction as irrefutable. I argue that this constellation of opinions contains a serious tension. In the light of the tension, I re-examine Hume's actual sceptical argument and show that the argument as it stands is valid but unsound. I argue that it can only be converted into a sound one if our inductive behaviour can be characterized as a process of rule-governed ampliation. Drawing on some Bayesian ideas, I argue that our inductive behaviour probably cannot be characterized in that way, so our immunity from Hume is secure. Finally, I compare my response to Hume's argument with some other well known responses.
Published Version
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