West Germany and Israel: Foreign Relations, Domestic Politics, and the Cold War, 1965–1974 by Carole Fink

Abstract

Reviewed by: West Germany and Israel: Foreign Relations, Domestic Politics, and the Cold War, 1965–1974 by Carole Fink Andrea Wiegeshoff West Germany and Israel: Foreign Relations, Domestic Politics, and the Cold War, 1965–1974. By Carole Fink. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. xiv + 349. Paper $29.99. ISBN 978-1107428287. Forty years after formal diplomatic ties were established between Israel and West Germany, the Israeli author Amos Oz, reflecting on the relationship between both countries, concluded that it was "intense, deep and broken, complicated and multilayered." Normal relations were "not possible and not appropriate" (Israel und Deutschland: Vierzig Jahre nach Aufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen, 2005, 7). In her new book, Carole Fink, a well-published expert on German, European, and international twentieth-century history, traces the initial years of this complex relationship. She focuses on the period from the exchange of ambassadors in 1965 up to 1974, the year in which both Golda Meir and Willy Brandt left office. Displaying an intimate knowledge of various mutual contacts, her account draws on an impressive array of primary sources, notably archival material from six countries. Fink paints a nuanced, yet forceful picture of a period characterized by a constant, shifting battle over the definition of the relationship's nature and terms. While the Israeli side emphasized the legacy of the Nazi past that marked all contacts as special, its West German counterpart strove to overcome the past and normalize bilateral relations. Fink describes the occasionally turbulent, sometimes tense, and often complicated relations in ten chronologically arranged chapters, focusing on high-level politics and decision makers. Though such an approach would seem conventional at first glance, the bilateral history of West Germany and Israel is embedded in the wider contexts of both global politics and the domestic factors—social, cultural, and economic—that inevitably influenced foreign policy. For instance, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the policy toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union preoccupied West German politicians and diplomats. Moreover, Bonn's diplomacy centered around the Arab world. Fink shows how the competition with the GDR and concerns about energy supplies led to efforts to repair strained relations with Middle Eastern countries. Naturally, the repercussions were strongly felt in Israel. West Germans were anxious to avoid the appearance of favoring Israel over the Arab world. Some contacts, such as the exchange of intelligence information and weapon sales, were therefore kept secret from the outside world. Moreover, the West German administration always went to great lengths to strike a balance between their relationship with Israel and the rest of the Middle East. For instance, foreign minister Walter Scheel traveled to Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon immediately before Willy Brandt visited Israel for the first time in 1973. [End Page 202] Israeli politicians grew increasingly impatient with Bonn's refusal to support the country more openly and its insistence on neutrality in times of military conflict. After the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel had emerged as a regional power, but increasingly faced isolation and international criticism because of the Palestinian refugee crisis and the occupation regime. At the same time, the country's borders remained insecure, violent conflicts and terrorist attacks occurred frequently, and military expenditures hampered economic development. In such precarious circumstances, the government appealed repeatedly to Germany's moral and historical obligation to stand by the Jewish state. Though many Germans shared this view, opposition to this claim grew stronger. Fink highlights not only the constant resistance by certain institutions, above all the West German foreign office, but also the confident stance taken by the new government under Brandt that saw itself unburdened by the Nazi past and thus freer to negotiate with Israel. Given the prominent place that former supporters of the NSDAP still occupied in the Federal Republic, as well as Israel's need for financial and military support, tensions between the governments increased. Matters were only made worse by the terrorist attack on Israel's team at the 1972 Munich Olympics and the subsequent (failed) German rescue mission, but also by recurring antisemitic incidents in the Federal Republic. Yet Fink also points to the stubborn persistence of the relationship. For instance, both sides valued their ongoing...