Abstract
: In contradiction to an article of Bonte and Lucke published recently in this journal, this article argues that insufficient quality of commissioned economic research basically results from distorted quality control incentives both for contractors and clients and not from asymmetric information between them. As a remedy, a mandatory publication of studies commissioned by public institutions is recommended. Such an obligation would not completely eliminate distorted incentives, but its influence on research quality would probably be higher than the influence of a referee procedure as suggested by Bonte and Lucke.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
