We Shared Something Special: The Moral Discourse of Incest Perpetrators

Abstract

At first glance, suggesting that incest perpetrators have moral perspectives on incest seems like an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms. Yet, incest perpetrators are embedded in cultures that view incest as morally repugnant, and laws make incest illegal. Along with other members of their cultures, incest perpetrators are socialized in varying degrees to understand the proscriptions against incest. Consequences for perpetrators can involve repugnance and shame heaped upon them, social ostracism, loss of family relationships, and legal sanctions. In addition, for victims and other family members, incest brings great harm (Armstrong, 1978; Briere, 1992; Browne & Finkelhor, 1986; Finkelhor & Dziuba-Leatherman, 1993; Friedrich, 1990; Gilgun, 1990, 1991; Herman, 1992; Rush, 1980; Russell, 1983; Wyatt, Newcomb, & Riederle, 1993). Self-interest, fairness, and concern for doing no harm, especially to persons in close family relationships, would appear to provide sufficient motivation to deter incest for those who might consider it. Yet, incest occurs in 1 in 6 families in the United States (Russell, 1983, 1986), and about 100,000 new cases occur each year (Williams & Finkelhor, 1992). Perpetrators are members of victims' nuclear and extended families. These figures demonstrate the ineffectiveness-for a large number of persons--of moral repugnance and consequent sanctions as deterrents. These figures also suggest an ability of incest perpetrators to suspend, reinterpret, or neutralize moral principles that enjoin them to promote the welfare of others and to avoid incest. In this article, I use the concepts of justice and care to analyze the narrative accounts of incest perpetrators. These concepts are fundamental ideas in moral philosophy and theories of moral development and were brought to widespread attention by the work of Carol Gilligan and her colleagues (Brown & Gilligan, 1992; Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan, Ward, & Taylor, 1988; Lyons, 1983). Data were gathered through open-ended life history interviews. Through narrative accounts, informants give meaning, value, and coherence to a sequence of events, or stories. Their moral values are infused in their accounts (Tappan, 1991). The method of data analysis and interpretation is modified analytic induction. MORAL DOMAINS Justice and care are central concepts in moral philosophy and theories of moral development (Bloom, 1986; Manning, 1992; Noddings, 1984). Though sometimes considered a set of prescriptions based on conceptions of justice (Kohlberg, 1984; Smetana, Kelly, & Twentyman, 1989), morality also is associated with a capacity for care. Controversy exists over whether care or justice is morally preferred and represents a higher level of moral development (Cortese & Mestrovic, 1990; Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan et al., 1988; Kohlberg, 1984; Manning, 1992; Noddings, 1984). Gender enters this controversy because a perspective emphasizing justice is associated with men's moral decision making while care is associated with women's decision making (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Larrabee, 1993). Currently emerging is the perspective that orientations toward justice and care are complementary. The integration of both perspectives characterizes not only morally mature and responsible individuals (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan et al., 1988; Manning, 1992), but also morally sensitive policies and a political system that, in the words of Bloom (1986), contributes to the personal, intellectual and moral growth of its citizens (p. 97). Criteria for making moral judgments often are implicit and involve interpretations of whether behaviors are just and caring in their intent and consequences and whether individuals take responsibility for the acts and for consequences (Bloom, 1986; Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan et al., 1988; Manning, 1992; Noddings, 1984; Smetana & Kelly, 1989). Care Care encompasses concern, loyalty, and love for self and others (Gilligan, 1982; Dewey, 1908/1980; O'Neill, 1989). …