We Have Not Correctly Framed the Debate on Intelligence Reform

Abstract

Over the last decade, our intelligence community has failed us. It wasn't able to penetrate the al Qaeda terrorist organization, and we paid a high price for that failure. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 were the first significant foreign attacks on the US mainland since the War of 1812. In the weeks and months leading up to 9/11, we failed to interpret, analyze, and share information gathered. Subsequently the intelligence community failed the President by presenting an inaccurate analysis of the quantities and capabilities of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction (WMD). While there should be no doubt whatsoever that Saddam's intentions were to reconstitute his WMD programs and become a supplier of these weapons to the radical Islamist terrorists who are bent on the destruction of democratic and secular Western societies, the fact remains that the CIA did not have a single agent inside Iraq to verify the true state of these programs before coalition forces, led by the United States, attacked Iraq in 2003. Today, the intelligence community is struggling to stay ahead of a host of threats to our security--the insurgency in Iraq that is taking American lives daily, the continuing war on terrorism, and the nuclear threat posed by |ran and North Korea, to name but a few. And there is an intelligence breakdown every time an improvised explosive device is detonated in Iraq killing American soldiers and marines. We have had huge, glaring intelligence failures, and the Administration and the Congress are working assiduously to improve our intelligence community as quickly as possible to better protect our people and our allies. On 17 December 2004, President Bush signed into law the most sweeping intelligence reform legislation since the National Security Act of 1947. The centerpiece of this intelligence legislation--articulated by the 9/11 Commission in its report, (1) embraced by the President, and endorsed by the Congress--is the creation of a new position to lead our intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The DNI will not head any single agency, as was the case when the 1947 National Security Act created the Central Intelligence Agency and dual-hatted the Director as the chief intelligence officer of the United States as well as running the CIA. Another positive aspect of the legislation is the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which will conduct strategic operational planning for joint counterintelligence operations. Our country is in the midst of a national debate on intelligence reform. In any endeavor of this type, the end result is largely dependent upon how the debate is framed, and we have not done a good or complete job of framing the debate on this issue of vital importance to the American people. Creating the DNI is an extremely important decision, and it forms the very foundation that is necessary to continue building intelligence capabilities. However, it is the beginning of a long process, not the end. Human Intelligence Last year's debate on intelligence reform should have centered on espionage, which we call human intelligence, or HUMINT, or spying. As we reframe the intelligence debate this year, we need to make sure HUMINT gets the right emphasis. Americans like technology and we are good at it. Our ability to monitor certain activities via satellites, signals intelligence, or other technical means, while not perfect, is pretty good. Our weak point is HUMINT, which has atrophied to the point that it must be rebuilt. Human intelligence, relative to the other intelligence disciplines, can tell us what the enemy is thinking. The strength of good HUMINT is that it can answer this key question: What are the enemy's intentions about when, where, and how to strike? In July 2002, as the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security in the House of Representatives, it was my responsibility, along with Ranking Member, Representative Jane Harman, to submit the first detailed report to Congress on intelligence deficiencies that existed prior to 11 September 2001. …