Waxing and waning selves

Abstract

Abstract Many philosophical discussions of the self focus on typical mature human selves, conceived as cognitively complex beings with self-consciousness, reflective capacities, and moral agency. Human infants do not yet have these capacities, many humans lose at least some of them late in life, and some never develop them at all. Most sentient nonhuman animals also lack these capacities. This chapter considers the selfhood of sentient beings without the capacities of mature human selves, including human infants, dementia patients, humans with cognitive disabilities, and nonhuman animals. It offers an overview of major theories of human psychological development, highlighting the standard developmental milestones for the transition of human infants into mature selves, noting that narrative accounts of human development, though different from narrative approaches to the true self, represent an important point of overlap between questions of basic self-development and development of the true self discussed in Chapter 2. The question of the selfhood of sentient beings without the cognitive sophistication of mature human selves is considered. This involves discussion of a potential distinction between the concepts of person and self. The idea of a minimal self, a bare subject of experience which is the same in all sentient beings, is introduced and discussed in detail, and questions are raised about its identity conditions. The issues discussed here raise important ethical questions, which are noted and considered throughout the chapter.