An Embodied Cognition Perspective on the Role of Interoception in the Development of the Minimal Self.

Lisa Musculus,Markus Raab,Ezgi Kayhan,Markus R Tünte

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.716950

Abstract

Interoception is an often neglected but crucial aspect of the human minimal self. In this perspective, we extend the embodiment account of interoceptive inference to explain the development of the minimal self in humans. To do so, we first provide a comparative overview of the central accounts addressing the link between interoception and the minimal self. Grounding our arguments on the embodiment framework, we propose a bidirectional relationship between motor and interoceptive states, which jointly contribute to the development of the minimal self. We present empirical findings on interoception in development and discuss the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self. Moreover, we make theoretical predictions that can be tested in future experiments. Our goal is to provide a comprehensive view on the mechanisms underlying the minimal self by explaining the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self.

Highlights

Reviewed by: Hari Narayanan V., Indian Institute of Technology, Jodhpur, India Thomas A
Grounding our arguments on the embodiment framework, we propose a bidirectional relationship between motor and interoceptive states, which jointly contribute to the development of the minimal self
Given the crucial role of the body in conceptualizing the sense of ownership and the sense of agency, and the human minimal self, it is surprising that internal bodily signals such as heartbeat and respiration have been largely ignored in this line of research (Tsakiris et al, 2011; Marshall et al, 2018; Seth and Tsakiris, 2018)

Summary

Introduction

Interoception is an often neglected but crucial aspect of the human minimal self In this perspective, we extend the embodiment account of interoceptive inference to explain the development of the minimal self in humans. From an embodied cognition perspective, it seems implausible that such bodily changes during development would not Interoception and the Developing Minimal Self affect the body representation, the minimal self. Our perspective aims to extend the embodied cognition account of interoceptive inference (Marshall et al, 2018) by explicitly focusing on the role of interoception in the development of the human minimal self. Our embodied cognition perspective considers bodily changes relevant to explaining human development (Musculus et al, 2021), and, here, relate it to the development of the self

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