Abstract
A wavering equilibrium theory of subsystem politics is developed to distinguish between three types of subsystem politics. I suggest that subsystem players' ability to control the policy agenda varies with changes in subsystem politics. This article uses correlation analysis with data on bill sponsorship and referral to examine the impact of subsystem variation on policy making in three subsystems. I find that subsystem political variation is associated with changes in subsystem players' ability to control bill introduction and referral.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
