Abstract
If judges are politically strategic, they may try to retire at times that maximize the chances that an ideologically compatible successor will be appointed. Using biographical data on all appellate judges who have retired since 1892, a heteroscedastic panel probit model is used to examine retirement timing as a function of personal and political factors. We determine whether retirement from the bench can be explained exclusively by personal factors such as salary, pension, and workload, or if political considerations enter into the decision. The data reveal that retirement decisions are affected primarily by nonpolitical considerations, but presidential elections may factor into a judge's decision. The only important strategic political consideration in evidence is whether a judge contemplating retirement faces an opposing party president and how far off that president's next election is.
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