Was the Rule of Law the Only Casualty of Polity Design in the New Latin American Constitutionalism?

Abstract

The objective of this article is to introduce a new concept for grouping all countermajoritarian instruments which became the true casualties of polity design during the New Latin American Constitutionalism (NLAC). This theoretical endeavor, which has not been undertaken until now, will be discussed on the basis of the constitutional upheavals that occurred between 1999 and 2009 in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. By addressing a specific theme of this experience, namely its implications for the relationship between democracy and countermajoritarian devices, this article shows why an aggregating concept such as state ataraxy is needed. This concept fills the gap that hinders understanding of what has been institutionally dismantled in the course of these reforms. The article then challenges the claim that with the collapse of countermajoritarian institutions, democracy necessarily collapses. It concludes with a new assessment of the novelty that the NLAC may have brought concerning the tension between democracy and countermajoritarian institutions. The findings contribute to understand one of the most enduring concerns of state theory in general, the tension between democracy and the rule of law.