Wars of Choice: Leaders, Rebellion Legacy, and Domestic Unrest

Abstract

Abstract Existing studies suggest that leaders that have earlier been participants in rebellions have a higher propensity for international conflict than leaders with no such experience. This paper examines whether prior involvement in rebellions will induce leaders to initiate international conflicts during domestic strife. I propose a preference modification approach and argue that rebel leaders’ policy choices during domestic unrest are a product of their pre-existing preferences and contextual factors. Specifically, I claim that the greater preference for conflict abroad during domestic unrest that former rebel leaders display than do their fellow leaders is contingent on the severity level of domestic problems. When facing serious internal unrest, rebel leaders are less likely than their non-rebel counterparts to engage in international conflicts due to the effect that critical domestic strife will have on the former’s perceptions and thus their policy preferences. Intense domestic strife predisposes rebel leaders to engage in both international conflict and domestic measures, which to some extent neutralises their original policy preference of international conflict as the sole policy response. By contrast, non-rebel leaders perceive more efficacy in international conflict during severe domestic unrest and are more likely to initiate an international dispute in that case. Statistical analyses of the international militarised dispute initiations of leaders under domestic strife from 1875 to 2000 reveal strong support for these arguments.