Abstract

AbstractHow have the structures of state systems varied over time and space? We outline a game theoretic model of the decision by political units to accept offers of graded sovereignty from imperial centers. We conceptualize four types of sovereign bargains – tributary, informal extractive, suzerain, and departmental – as a function of whether a polity has external sovereignty and whether resources flow from the subordinate polity to the imperial center through transfers or direct extraction. We then specify the payoffs for these bargains and theorize how increasing interaction capacity and international competition shape the structure of state systems. We show how increasing interaction capacity is related to the transition from transfers to extraction while international competition plays a role only when interaction capacity is already high. We demonstrate the applicability of our model with case studies from low- and high-density environments during the early modern period, respectively: (1) The Oyo Empire of western Africa; (2) Mysore of south Asia.

Highlights

  • Attempts to conceptualize and model system structures across space and time remain sparse, and no one to our knowledge has attempted to do so using game theory. We contribute to this literature by proposing and testing a formal model for comparative systems analysis. It is theoretically grounded in the work on sovereign contracting (Cooley 2005; Cooley and Spruyt 2009; Nexon 2009; Dillon-Savage 2019) and allows us to explore the effects of international competition and interaction capacity on state system structure (Tilly 1992; Ruggie 1993; Spruyt 1994; Buzan and Little 2000; Herbst 2000)

  • Recent scholarship in international relations has seen a turn toward the conceptualization of political order in non-Western and pre-modern regions of the world

  • We contribute to that turn with a game-theoretic model of political order, one that can be applied to diverse regions across time and space, and one that clarifies the relationship between different forms of political order and system-level factors such as interaction capacity and the threat of war

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Summary

Transfers Tributary Suzerain

Extraction Informal extractive Departmental while panel (b) is a mixed arrangement and panel (c) is an empire-like decentralized arrangement where Ps retain domestic autonomy but cede external sovereignty. Panels (d)–(e) show systems where one P retains its external sovereignty while having either informal extractive or tributary relations with I. I’s relationship with a subordinate P changes from departmental to suzerainty in panels (d)– (e). These examples are not exhaustive, and we model one I and one P in this paper, Figure 1 illustrates how this conceptualization could be extended to multi-actor environments. We specify the payoffs for I and P of accepting these different bargains

Payoffs for sovereign bargains
Interaction capacity and international competition
The Oyo Empire
Findings
Conclusions
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