Abstract

In the second half of the second world war the promise of retaliation (Vergeltung) against the United Kingdom was a theme of increasing importance in Nazi domestic propaganda. The military setbacks following Stalingrad were accompanied by a sharp increase in the intensity of Allied bombing of Germany. The raids themselves constituted the most immediate and visible proof of enemy superiority and of the fact that the tide had turned. Virtually all attempts by Nazi propagandists to offset the negative effects of this development its stress on the high losses in enemy aircraft, the increase in German armament production, the promise to rebuild the devastated cities after 'final victory', the strengthening of the 'defence will' of the German people failed miserably. What is more, since May 1941 the air war had become a very onesided affair and the Luftwaffe, tied up in Russia, was unable to launch more than the occasional light raid on British targets. Unable to conceal this inability to strike immediate hard blows at the enemy, all the Nazi leadership could do was promise all-out retaliation at some time in the future. It was encouraged in its hopes by the development of new and revolutionary long-distance missiles at Peenemunde and supposed that these would be ready for employment by the end of 1943. But the success of the promise of Vergeltung ultimately depended on its realization. The German people, however, had to wait until June 1944 until words were backed up by action, and it is this long waiting period which is the subject of this study of Nazi propaganda behaviour and German civilian morale.

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