Waging CommunicationWar

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In Iraq and Afghanistan, United States is fighting wars in which ef.fective communication of ideas and information is vital. Strategists in both these conflicts increasingly share with classic counterinsurgency theorists a keen appreciation that they are fighting for support of population, and that communication is a key part of struggle. This article sets out to explore ramifications of this feature of modern war. Communications may be vital, but how should operational and tactical commander use them to best advantage? Why have US military and civilian authorities found effective communication so difficult in current struggle against militant Islamism? The US military has now formally incorporated what might be called communication war into doctrine, both in its dedicated counterinsurgency field manual and in its newly updated operational field manual, comerstone of overall doctrine. (1) Both manuals go into some detail about importance of communication and related concepts, such as media, public affairs, psychological operations, and information operations. While manuals offer compelling advice on what should be achieved in information domain, guidance on how to achieve it is somewhat lacking. This distinction reflects complexity of communication in warfare, particularly in wars involving irregular forces engaged in insurgency. Many actors and variables are involved, and few of them are under direct control of those in operational chain of command. Consider some of factors: The strategic direction, which greatly influences popular attitudes toward conflict, is formed largely in political stratosphere of Washington, and partly in conjunction with allied governments. Politically savvy senior leaders can certainly influence direction of this strategy, but there are also other powerful actors involved. Likewise, actions of host nation government, though perhaps amenable to military influence by theater commanders, are not wholly, or even largely, within their control. In world of diffuse, fragmented media, people themselves have increasingly become players in shaping terms of debate, as part of noisy discourse in both traditional and new media. Lastly, of course, enemy also has a stake in information contest. As for process, means of communicating with audiences are, to a large extent, in hands of an independent-minded media--some of which may be inimically opposed to commander's strategic and tactical efforts or may simply follow less than professional standards of objectivity and impartiality. Then audiences with whom commander hopes to interact are fragmented, geographically and socially. Reaching them with a coherent and credible message is far from straightforward. The only communication levers firmly within commander's grasp may be forces and associated civilian personnel serving in theater, but many of these may lack training, equipment, and cultural awareness necessary to communicate effectively in support of overall campaign. The complexity is such that even Frank Kitson, stellar reputation in counterinsurgency field notwithstanding, effectively threw up his hands when it came to processes of winning over populations. It is in men's minds that wars of subversion have to be fought and decided, he declared in his landmark study of low-intensity operations, before ruefully concluding 170 pages later that the question of men's attitudes is an interesting one, but although in a sense relevant to purpose of this study, it is so hedged around with imponderables that no useful purpose would be served by further speculation in this context. Perhaps some qualified person will take matter up later on, and research it in a scientific way. (2) The situation now is even more complicated than Kitson found in Malaya and Kenya. …