Vulnerabilities and Reliability of ReRAM Based PUFs and Memory Logic

Abstract

Resistive Random-Access Memory (ReRAM) devices have caught significant research attention as scalable nonvolatile memory technology for high-density data storage in 3-D crossbar architectures. ReRAM devices can switch with low programming voltages (<±1 V) at fast time-scales (≍10–100 ns) that make them an attractive option for not only off-chip data storage but also for on-chip embedded memory applications. ReRAM devices have also been explored for applications as reconfigurable switches in field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). The random variabilities in the switching performance of ReRAM has been exploited to design Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) for hardware authentication, trust, and security. However, intrinsic vulnerabilities in ReRAM devices and its implications are not well-understood. Therefore, there is an urgent need to understand these so that the ReRAM-based circuits can be made robust against such attacks. This paper discusses our research on understanding the vulnerabilities in ReRAM through experimental studies and its implications on ReRAM based PUF operations. The Process, Voltage, Temperature (PVT) variabilities in ReRAM is experimentally studied and modeled. Some other ReRAM specific vulnerabilities, such as insertion of parasitic capacitances and Trojans by adversaries and its impact on ReRAM switching behavior is discussed. Based on experimental studies, models are created to capture these behaviors in ReRAM. Using these models, a 1 KB array of ReRAM devices in a crossbar architecture and its behavior is simulated. The challenge–response pairs of these ReRAM-based arrays were studied under ideal Trojan free conditions as well as with vulnerabilities models of ReRAM. Potential solutions are then proposed to make the PUF architecture and ReRAM devices more resistant to these vulnerabilities.