Abstract

Abstract Vote buying, the offer of particularistic rewards to voters in exchange for electoral support at the ballot box, is the form of clientelism that has been analyzed most extensively in previous studies. Chapter 7 documents the presence of this clientelistic strategy in East European elections. It documents important differences between vote buying and clientelistic strategies that politicize state resources relating to the types of brokers used in these exchanges, the goods offered to voters, and the identity of the voters targeted by these strategies. It is shown that the use of this strategy creates opportunities for candidates to send voters signals about their personal attributes and policy position, which lower the political audience costs incurred by candidates who use this strategy.

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