Disaggregating Clientelism

Abstract

Abstract Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework of the analysis. Definitional and conceptual issues related to the study of electoral clientelism are clarified, and a classification of clientelistic strategies that differentiates among strategies based on public versus private resources, and those structured as positive promises versus negative threats, is proposed. A theory is built that begins by conceptualizing the way that voters who are directly and indirectly exposed to different forms of clientelism perceive and react to it. Drawing on normative theories, it is conjectured that voters are likely to judge coercive strategies more severely than strategies premised on positive inducements. While candidates incur political audience costs from using various clientelistic strategies, they may attempt to reduce the severity of this constraint by sending voters signals about their personal attributes and their policy positions. The chapter develops theoretical expectations about the informational signals that may result from the use of different non-programmatic strategies for voters with certain policy preferences or characteristics. Finally, the chapter conceptualizes how these audience costs and resource constraints shape the choices that politicians make about the level and form of clientelism that they use. The normative reactions of voters and their likelihood of complying with the clientelistic exchanges shape the potential effectiveness of different strategies. It is also predicted that politicians’ abilities to employ different forms of clientelism are shaped by access to resources, including, most importantly, control of local flows of social policy through city halls.