Abstract
Abstract In what follows I will try to show that hinge propositions do not constitute the ultimate ground upon which we stand fast, but rather voice a metaphysical temptation, the temptation to offer an ultimate and undoubtable foundation of which we can be absolutely certain. After a brief sketch of what hinge propositions are, I propose that we read them as exclamations pointing to nonsense, a limit to intelligibility. Interpreted thus, hinge propositions, either ascertained or doubted, show what nonsense in On Certainty might be, namely, the confusion that either their certitude or doubt produce. I will try to substantiate my interpretation showing that Wittgenstein in On Certainty was well aware of the temptation to proclaim hinge propositions as absolute certainties – a temptation he rejects. I will try to establish the above claim by offering a critique of Moyal-Sharrock’s interpretation that we read hinges as merely showing and not as something that we can explicitly acknowledge, say or articulate.
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