Vision Science and the Problem of Perception

Abstract

“Vision science—as Palmer puts it in his introduction to a recent, impressive work on the subject—is not just one branch of cognitive science, but the single most coherent, integrated and successful”.TPPT However chauvinist this judgment may seem, vision has undoubtedly been and still is a very important area in cognitive science, stimulating a particularly rich discussion between philosophers and scientists. There are two opposing, radical attitudes with regard to the relation between philosophy and cognitive science. On the one hand are those (including most, but by no means all philosophers) who think that conclusions following from a priori arguments are more substantial than the empirical results provided by current sciences of mind. These people are inclined to regard such or such psychological theory as confirmation of their philosophical bents. On the other hand, there are scholars who accord priority at least to the most well-established experimental results. Building on empirical evidence, they try to outline a philosophical picture coherent with (current) scientific findings. Although I am in general more sympathetic with the latter strategy, I believe there are problems in the field which are still so hard to assess that we ought to assume a more pliant and cautious attitude, as will be shown in this chapter. Based upon the analysis of a case study— the controversy between direct and indirect realism—I will argue that some results from cognitive science can cast light on philosophical problems about visual perception. At the same time, however, it will become clear how the empirical research is also still constrained by philosophical hypotheses and prejudices.