Abstract
In chapter 1 we encountered a simple form of reliabilism about knowledge, called process reliabilism. This held that knowledge is true belief that is formed via a reliable process, where a reliable process is one that tends to lead to true beliefs rather than false beliefs. We noted that process reliabilism cannot deal with Gettier-style cases, and hence that it cannot be a fully adequate account of knowledge, at least as it stands. Given that Gettier-style cases essentially trade on the anti-luck intuition — the intuition that knowledge involves a true belief that is not true simply as a matter of luck — it follows that process reliabilism cannot accommodate this platitude about knowledge.KeywordsTrue BeliefCausal ExplanationProcess ReliabilismVirtue EpistemologyEpistemic LuckThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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