Republic 382A–D: On the Dangers and Benefits of Falsehood

Abstract

Previous articleNext article FreeRepublic 382A–D: On the Dangers and Benefits of FalsehoodNicholas R. BaimaNicholas R. BaimaUniversity of Missouri–Columbia Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMore1. IntroductionSocrates’ attitude toward falsehood in the Republic is quite puzzling.1 Although Socrates is clearly committed to truth, at several points he discusses the benefits of falsehood. This occurs most notably in Book 3 with the “noble lie” (414d–415c) and most disturbingly in Book 5 with the “rigged sexual lottery” (459d–460c). This raises the question: What kinds of falsehoods does Socrates think are beneficial, and what kinds of falsehoods does he think are harmful? And more broadly: What can this tell us about the relationship between ethics and epistemology?The key to answering these questions lies in an obscure and paradoxical passage in Book 2.382a–d, when Socrates distinguishes between “true falsehoods” and “impure lies.” True falsehoods are always bad, but impure lies are sometimes beneficial. Despite Socrates’ insistence that he is not saying anything deep, his distinction is far from straightforward. Nevertheless, in order to determine why some falsehoods are beneficial and why some are always harmful, we must understand what exactly true falsehoods are and how they differ from impure lies.In this paper, I argue that true falsehoods are a restricted class of false beliefs about ethics: they are false beliefs about how one should live and what one should pursue. I refer to these beliefs as “normative commitments.” False normative commitments are always pernicious because they create and sustain psychological disharmony. Unlike true falsehoods, impure lies can be about anything. Nevertheless, they are only beneficial when they help produce and sustain true normative commitments. I argue that the upshot of this is that practical concerns have a kind of primacy over theoretical concerns.22. True Falsehood and Impure LieThe text (viz., 382a–d) is situated at the end of Book 2; Socrates and Adeimantus have been discussing the merits of the current educational system, which centers around the poems of Hesiod, Homer, and others. Socrates assesses how the poets depict the gods and whether this account is both true and proper for educational purposes. Socrates examines three aspects of the gods as presented by the poets. First, the poets represent the gods as causing both badness and goodness (379a–380a). Socrates finds this objectionable, arguing that because the gods are completely good, they can only cause goodness (379c). Second, the poets depict the gods as changing forms (380d). Socrates finds this problematic because the gods cannot alter themselves. The gods are already in the best condition; any alteration from that condition would be to change them into something worse (381b–c). Third, the poets represent the gods as deceiving humans by presenting themselves as something that they are not. Socrates asks, “But may we suppose that while the gods themselves are incapable of change, they make us believe that they appear in many shapes, deceiving and practicing magic upon us?” (381e8–10). Adeimantus responds, “Perhaps” (381e11). Adeimantus’ response surprises Socrates and leads him to ask, “What? Would a god be willing to deceive [ψεύδεσθαι] in either word or deed, by presenting an illusion?” (382a1–2).When Adeimantus expresses uncertainty (382a3), Socrates attempts to identify a kind of deception or falsehood that no god or human would accept. Socrates says, “Don’t you know that all gods and humans hate at least the true falsehood [τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος], if one can put it this way?” (382a4–5).3 The paradoxical name, “true falsehood” (ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος), confuses Adeimantus (382a6). Socrates clarifies himself by explaining that “no one willingly deceives [ψεύδεσθαι] the most authoritative part [τῷ κυριωτάτῳ] of himself and about the most authoritative things [περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα], but everyone most of all fears accepting it [viz., falsehood] there” (382a7–9).4 Understandably, Adeimantus is still quite puzzled (382a10).Socrates attributes this confusion to Adeimantus mistakenly thinking that he is saying something profound or holy (σεµνός). Socrates explains that he simply means that “to deceive and to have deceived [ψεύδεσθαί τε καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι] one’s soul about the things that are [περὶ τὰ ὄντα], and to be ignorant [ἀµαθῆ], and to have and to hold falsehood [ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος] there is what everyone would least accept and would most hate in their soul” (382b1–5). Surprisingly, Adeimantus expresses that he understands (382b6).Now that Socrates has Adeimantus’ agreement, he attempts to justify his use of the paradoxical name “true falsehood” by contrasting it with a “not altogether pure falsehood” (οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος).5 He explains that the former occurs when one has ignorance in one’s soul (382b7–9), while the latter is a “kind of imitation in words [ἐν λόγοις µίµηµα] of the condition [παθήµατος] in the soul [i.e., ignorance], an image [εἴδωλον] that arises later” (382b9–c1).With this distinction in place, Socrates explains that the “real falsehood” (τῷ ὄντι ψεῦδος) is hated by both gods and humans (382c3–4), whereas the falsehood in words is not always hated by humans (but is by gods). Socrates likens falsehood in words to a useful drug, which can be used for preventing the ignorant or mad from doing bad (382c6–10).6 Additionally, Socrates explains that when discussing ancient stories that one is ignorant of (cf. 376e–378e) falsehood can be useful when it is as close to the truth as possible (382d1–3).7Socrates is distinguishing between a “true” (ὡς ἀληθῶς) or “real [τῷ ὄντι] falsehood” and an imitative falsehood that is “not altogether pure” (οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον). Hereafter, I shall simply refer to the former kind of falsehood as a “true falsehood” and the latter kind of falsehood as an “impure falsehood.” Socrates’ explanation of the distinction is convoluted, and thus warrants a careful analysis. It will be helpful to begin with a general summary of the distinction. True falsehoods and impure falsehoods differ in their location, ontology, content, and effect. For instance, Socrates says that true falsehoods are located in the soul and in the most authoritative place (τῷ κυριωτάτῳ). In contrast, impure falsehoods are located in words (ἐν λόγοις ψεῦδος). They differ in ontology to the extent that true falsehoods are real8 and involve actual ignorance, while impure falsehoods are imitative and merely appear as real falsehoods. Socrates describes true falsehoods as being about the most authoritative things (περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα), but does not specify the content of impure falsehoods. True falsehoods are always worthy of hatred, and thus are never useful. However, impure falsehoods are not always worthy of hatred to the extent that they are sometimes useful.9 A visual representation of these distinctions is found in Table 1 below.Table 1. Basic Differences between the True Falsehood and the Impure Falsehood LocationOntologyContentEffectTrue falsehoodSoul, the most authoritative part of oneselfRealAbout the most authoritative thingsAlways harmful, never beneficialImpure falsehoodWordsImitative?Sometimes harmful, sometimes beneficialView Table ImageNow that we have a clear overview, we can begin to examine each aspect in more detail. Let us begin with the categories of location and ontology. As I just explained, Socrates says that true falsehoods are real and are located in the soul and the most authoritative part of oneself. However, it is unclear what exactly this means. There are two possible interpretations: Either the soul is the most authoritative part of oneself, or the most authoritative part of oneself is a specific part of the soul, such as the reasoning part of the soul. Both interpretations have textual support;10 nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, not much will depend on settling this dispute, and thus we can leave the issue in a stalemate.The more pressing question is: What kind of things are true falsehoods? The most straightforward answer is that true falsehoods are false beliefs. This is the most obvious answer because true falsehoods are located in the soul, and beliefs are the psychological attitudes that are standardly understood as being true or false.However, there is a notable objection to this reading. Christopher Gill argues that Socrates is using the terms “true” and “false” in a nonstandard (i.e., nonpropositional way).11 For instance, he says that “while such a state consists, in part, in having false ethical beliefs, it is clear from the larger context that such ‘falsehood’ is a property of the personality as a whole … Correspondingly, ‘truth’ (at least, ‘truth in the psyche’) must also be a state of the whole personality and not just a property of statements or beliefs.”12 In support of this interpretation, Gill cites the fact that Socrates uses the terms “true” and “false” in other nonstandard ways in the Republic.13 For instance, Socrates describes god as being true in deed and word (382e8) and says that pleasures can be “true” and “false” (585d–586e; cf. Phlb. esp. 40c–41a).Nevertheless, the evidence in favor of Gill’s reading is lacking. First, in both of these passages (i.e., 382e8, 582d–586e) it is not obvious that it is necessary to read “true” and “false” in nonstandard ways, and it is possible to make sense of “true deeds” or “true pleasures” in a way that is compatible with standard accounts of truth. For example, in describing the gods as “true in deed,” Socrates might simply be conveying the idea that the gods are honest and do not deceive or manipulate humans. Second, and more importantly, even if we are forced to interpret these passages (i.e., 382e8 and 582d–586e) as using a nonstandard account of truth, this does not force a nonstandard reading of truth in the notion “falsehood in the soul.” There is nothing inconsistent in Socrates using a nonstandard account of truth to talk about “true deeds” or “true pleasure” and using a standard account of truth to talk about “falsehood in soul.” Without any further reasons for entertaining an extended use of truth when interpreting falsehood in the soul, it is best to interpret falsehood in the soul simply as false beliefs.In contrast to true falsehoods, impure falsehoods are located in words and are an imitation of ignorance. This seems to suggest that impure falsehoods are verbal assertions with false content. If we understand these false verbal assertions as lies told by people who know the truth,14 then we have a clear explanation for the imitative nature of impure falsehoods.15 For example, suppose Felipe lies to Sarah by telling her that Michael Jordan never played for the Chicago Bulls. Felipe does not actually believe this; he knows that Michael Jordan played for the Chicago Bulls. However, in order for Felipe’s lie to be successful, his assertion has to appear to represent his actual beliefs. That is, he must appear to Sarah as someone who actually believes that Michael Jordan never played for the Chicago Bulls, which is to say that he must imitate being ignorant.16 Hence, I argue that the contrast between true falsehoods and impure falsehoods is between false beliefs and verbal lies; true falsehoods are false beliefs, while impure falsehoods are verbal lies; because of this, for the remainder of the paper I will use the term “impure lie” to refer to οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος.Many scholars, however, hold a different opinion; they argue that the fundamental difference between true falsehoods and impure lies is that impure lies are false beliefs about unimportant things and thus are beneficial (or at the very least, not devastating to an agent), while true falsehoods are false beliefs about important things, and thus always harm an agent.17 I disagree with this interpretation for two reasons: First, it conflates the “content” and “effect” with the “location” and “ontology.” From 382a–d, it is clear that Socrates means to keep these things separate. Second, and more importantly, at 382c6–10, Plato makes it clear that impure lies are not always useful, but are only sometimes useful. Hence, a generic feature of impure lies cannot be that they are useful, since this is not always the case.Although the contrast between true falsehoods and impure lies is between false beliefs and verbal lies, it is a mistake to think that all false beliefs are true falsehoods.18 This interpretation is problematic for two reasons. First, Plato makes it clear that true falsehoods are about the most authoritative things, which indicates that true falsehoods are false beliefs restricted to a certain domain (i.e., the most authoritative things). Second, Plato makes it clear that lies are sometimes beneficial (i.e., impure lies). Presumably, these lies are beneficial because of the false beliefs that they produce and sustain. For example, when Felipe lies to Sarah saying that p, this lie can only be beneficial for Sarah if she forms the false belief that p. In other words, there is a symmetry between the lies that are beneficial or harmful to tell and the false beliefs that are beneficial or harmful to believe, such that beneficial lies produce beneficial false beliefs and harmful lies produce harmful false beliefs. Call this the “symmetry thesis.”With this in mind, we can distinguish between four kinds of falsehoods: false beliefs that are sometimes beneficial and sometimes harmful to possess (i.e., contingent falsehoods),19 false beliefs that are always harmful and never beneficial to possess (i.e., true falsehoods), lies that are sometimes beneficial and sometimes harmful to tell (i.e., impure lies), and lies that are always harmful and never beneficial to tell (i.e., impure lies).Table 2 provides a visual representation of the various distinctions. As one can see, the content of the falsehood (either a lie or a belief) plays a fundamental role in determining whether the falsehood is necessarily harmful or contingently harmful. When the falsehood is about the most authoritative things it necessarily is harmful. Nevertheless, if the falsehood is about something else, then the falsehood can be harmful or beneficial depending on various circumstances. Because of this, we must determine what the most authoritative things are. This is the task of the next section.Table 2. Four Types of Falsehoods in the Republic LocationOntologyFormContentEffectTrue falsehoodSoul/reason?RealBeliefAbout the most authoritative thingsAlways harmful, never beneficialContingent falsehoodSoul/reason?RealBeliefNot about the most authoritative thingsSometimes harmful, sometimes beneficialImpure lieWordsImitativeLieAbout the most authoritative thingsAlways harmful, never beneficialImpure lieWordsImitativeLieNot about the most authoritative thingsSometimes harmful, sometimes beneficialView Table Image3. The Most Authoritative ThingsThere are two plausible candidates for what Socrates means by the most authoritative things at 2.382a–d. They are either the old Socratic issues of the early dialogues (such as ethical considerations about how one should live), or they are they are the Platonic issues that concern metaphysical or philosophical matters (such as the Forms). In other words, the question is: Does a true falsehood involve having a false belief about basic ethical facts, or does it involve being ignorant of the Forms? In this section I shall argue that the former provides the best interpretation. I shall proceed by first giving a positive argument in defense of this view. Following this, I shall explain why this position is stronger than the latter interpretation.However, before I move on, I need to clarify what might be a source of confusion. The question I am asking is not whether some ethical truths are metaphysically independent of the Forms. Rather, the question is: Do you have a true falsehood if you have a false belief about certain ethical matters? Or, do you have a true falsehood if you are ignorant of the Forms? Notice that if you are ignorant of the former, you are necessarily ignorant of the Form of the Good because, presumably, knowledge of the Form of the Good entails grasping basic ethical truths. However, the inverse is not true, to the extent that you can have a true belief about a basic ethical fact while being completely ignorant of the Form of the Good. For instance, Susan can grasp that she should help her elderly neighbor carry his groceries into his apartment without knowing anything about the Form of the Good. This holds true even if the Form of the Good grounds the fact that helping her elderly neighbor is a good action.Fundamentally, what is at stake in this debate is how damning the ignorance of the non-philosophers is. From Socrates’ discussion at 2.382a–d it is clear that true falsehoods are the worst and most hated kind of falsehood or ignorance one can possess. Thus, if true falsehoods involve ignorance or false beliefs about the Forms, then this bodes much worse for the non-philosophers because they do not have knowledge of the Forms. However, if true falsehoods involve ignorance or false beliefs about basic ethical facts, which non-philosophers are capable of grasping, then Plato has a much more optimistic view of non-philosophers in the Republic insofar as they do not possess the worst kind of falsehood—namely, the true falsehood.20A. Basic Ethical FactsThe key to understanding what Socrates means by the most authoritative things is found in the passages that immediately precede and follow 382a–d. In Book 2, just before the introduction of the term “true falsehood,” Socrates complains to Adeimantus that the poets depict the gods acting immorally. He says, “Telling the greatest falsehood about the most important things [τὸ µέγιστον ψεῦδος καὶ περὶ τῶν µεγίστων] doesn’t make a fine story” (377e6–7). The example he gives is of Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus acting unjustly (377e–378a). The story is not “fine,” and the reason it is not fine is because it depicts the gods acting in despicable ways, and this sends the wrong message to the audience of the poems (378b).21This passage suggests that the most important things have to do with ethics and how justice is portrayed. If the greatest of gods is depicted as acting unjustly, Socrates worries that stories like this will make the citizens believe that acting unjustly is acceptable—perhaps even praiseworthy. This will lead the citizens to cultivate the wrong psychological dispositions; as a result, they will mistake what is good for bad and bad for good.22This worry is echoed in Socrates’ criticism of the poets in Book 3 (392b1–6):Because I think we’ll say that what poets and prose-writers tell us about the most important matters concerning human beings [περὶ ἀνθρώπων τὰ µέγιστα] is bad. They say that many unjust people are happy and many just ones wretched, that injustice is profitable if it escapes detection, and that justice is another’s good, but one’s own loss. I think we’ll prohibit these stories and order the poets to compose the opposite kind of poetry and tell the opposite kind of tales.In this passage, the most important matters concerning human beings are explained in terms of how justice relates to happiness. It is dangerous if the citizens are taught that justice leads to unhappiness and that injustice leads to happiness. Stories like this will mislead citizens about what is good and bad, thereby leading them to cultivate bad psychological dispositions.Hence, in the passages that surround 382a–d, “the most important things” (τὰ µέγιστα) are ethical matters.23 However, what reason do we have for thinking that “the most important things” (τὰ µέγιστα) are “the most authoritative things” (τὰ κυριώτατα)? The gap between τὰ µέγιστα and τὰ κυριώτατα is bridged in Book 3. Having just discussed the types of music and poetry that are beneficial for education, Socrates asserts that music and poetry are the most authoritative (κυριωτάτη) education because they can affect one’s psychology in the greatest way (401d–e). Music and poetry do this in two ways: First, because rhythm and harmony permeate the inner part of the soul more than anything else, they can affect it in the strongest way. Second, a proper education in music and poetry will give one the ability to recognize what is fine and good, even if one does not yet understand the reason why these things are fine and good (401d–402b).24 Thus, music and poetry are the most authoritative form of education because a proper education in music and poetry supplies one with the basic psychological dispositions necessary for living well.25 This was the same reason why the stories at 2.377e6–7 and 3.392b1–6 are the most important—they concern fundamental ethical issues about how to live. Therefore, I hold that the most authoritative things concern ethical facts about how to live. This is not a revisionary perspective, for it is just the kind of thing we see in Plato’s early dialogues. For example, in the Apology, Socrates tells us that he has spent his life trying to persuade others that their primary concern in life should be the condition of their soul and whether it is good or not.26B. The FormsAs I previously mentioned, an alternative interpretation is that the most authoritative things are metaphysical or philosophical things, such as the Forms. Hence, on this reading true falsehoods are false beliefs about these metaphysical things. Before I object to this position, I should note that this view has some plausibility. The most worked out defenses of such a position are found in both David Simpson’s and Raphael Woolf’s respective work.27 They point out that in Book 6, Socrates maintains that “the most important subject of learning” (µέγιστον µάθηµα) is the Form of the Good (503e–505a). Additionally, in Book 7, Socrates describes the Form of the Good as having authority (κύριος) in the intelligible realm and providing truth and understanding (517c). This provides some evidence for thinking of the Forms as the most authoritative things. Additionally, Plato makes it clear in the Republic that understanding the Forms is evaluatively more important than possessing mere true beliefs about basic facts. This interpretation has a clear explanation for why this is the case—the Forms are the most authoritative things. Moreover, at 382b1–5, Socrates says that true falsehoods are about “the things that are” (περὶ τὰ ὄντα) and later in the Republic (Books 5–7), Plato argues that “the things that are” are the Forms. Hence, one could take this as evidence that Plato is talking about the Forms at 382b1–5.Nevertheless, this interpretation faces three serious problems. First, the fact that Socrates describes the Form of the Good as “important” or as an “authority” does not vindicate the Forms interpretation over the ethics interpretation because the Form of the Good is highly relevant to particular ethical matters. In other words, these passages can also support the reading that the most authoritative things are ethical facts concerning how to live.Second, at 382b1–5, Socrates emphasizes that he is not saying anything σεµνός when discussing true falsehoods. The Greek word σεµνός means holy, profound, or majestic, and it is often used to describe the gods and other divine things.28 This poses a significant problem for reading “the most authoritative things” as the Forms because Plato describes the Forms as divine. For example, in Book 6, Socrates explains that “by consorting with what is ordered and divine [θείῳ]” the philosopher “becomes as divine [θεῖος] and ordered as a human can be” (500c9–d2). I take it to be uncontroversial that the ordered and divine things that the philosopher is consorting with are the Forms. After all, a few lines later Socrates describes the study of the Form of the Good as the most important subject for philosophers (503e–505a).29 Additionally, in Book 7, Socrates explains that once out of the cave, the philosopher is able to look at divine images of the things that are (i.e., the Forms) (532c). Now, because the Forms are divine, and divine things are σεµνός, it follows that the Forms are σεµνός. This poses a serious problem for this interpretation because at 382b1–5, Socrates makes it clear that in talking about true falsehoods he is not saying anything σεµνός.Now one might object by arguing that when Socrates tells Adeimantus that he is not saying anything σεµνός, Socrates is not referring to the quality or property of true falsehoods. Rather, Socrates is simply telling Adeimantus that he is overthinking his explanation of true falsehoods. In other words, true falsehoods might be false beliefs about things that are holy or majestic, but it does not follow from this that one’s explanation of true falsehoods is profound or deep.30In response to this objection, I should point out that if Socrates is talking about the Forms at 382a–d, then his explanation of true falsehoods is even more elusive and cryptic than it first appears. This is because 382a–d is sandwiched between discussions that are primarily about education and not about metaphysics. Thus, if Socrates is sneaking in complex metaphysical ideas—ideas that are not explained until much later in the text—then he should have asked Adeimantus to think harder because he is, in fact, saying something quite profound. This is powerful evidence against reading “the things that are” (περὶ τὰ ὄντα) at 382b1–5 as the Forms.31Third, and most importantly, if true falsehoods are false beliefs about metaphysical things, such as the Forms, then it follows that it is always harmful to possess false beliefs about the nature of reality. Now, assuming that the symmetry thesis is true, if it is always harmful to possess false beliefs about the nature of reality, then it is always harmful to lie about the nature of reality. The problem with interpreting true falsehoods as false beliefs about the Forms is that in the “allegory of the cave” philosophers lie to the non-philosophers about the nature of reality. For instance, Socrates explains that disastrous social results could ensue if the non-philosopher were told that the sights and sounds were not real (517a3–6):Soc:Wouldn’t it be said of him [viz., the philosopher] that he’d returned from his upward journey with his eyesight ruined and that it isn’t worthwhile even to try to travel upward? And, as for anyone who tried to free them [viz., the non-philosophers] and lead them upward, if they could somehow get their hands on him, wouldn’t they kill him?Glau:They certainly would.One lesson to draw from this passage is that philosophers should not attempt to teach non-philosophers about the Forms. The non-philosophers do not have the intellectual capacity nor the proper education to understand the Forms. If a philosopher attempts to teach a non-philosopher about the Forms, the non-philosopher would likely think that the philosopher was foolish and that his nonsense teachings are dangerous to the city.32 Hence, it is best if philosophers do not attempt to disrupt the non-philosophers’ mistaken beliefs about nature of reality by telling them the truth. If the philosophers are to guide society, they have to do it by telling falsehoods. Some of these falsehoods will be about the nature of reality, and these false beliefs will benefit the non-philosophers.This is a point that Woolf fails to see; for instance, he says, “That someone is not philosophical, by contrast, makes it not bad but pointless to impart certain truths, namely the philosophical ones; for they could not be grasped by such a person.”33 I disagree; 517a3–7 suggests that it is bad to try to communicate these truths; but it does not suggest that it is pointless. One of the upshots of this is that sometimes we ought not to tell the truth even when it is about divine things, such as the Forms. That is, sometimes we should not be gadflies (cf. Ap. 30e).One might object by arguing that although philosophers are not telling non-philosophers the truth about the Forms or the nature of reality, it is not the case that they are straightforwardly lying to them about the Forms and reality. For example, if philosophers fail to tell non-philosophers the whole truth about reality, does it follow that they are lying about reality? By my lights, this seems to be a paradigm example of lying.34 After all, philosophers are intentionally causing non-philosophers to have and to continue to have false beliefs about facts that they know. However, a full discussion of what exactly constitutes a lie will lead us too far astray; what is essential for the purposes of this paper is that philosophers make false verbal assertions that produce and sustain false beliefs about the nature of reality in non-philosophers, and these false assertions produce a better outcome than if philosophers were to tell the truth about these things.Independent of my arguments against the Forms reading, one might find it odd that on my reading “the things that are” at 382b refers to ethical facts about how to live. One might wonder why Socrates is using descriptive language to refer to normative content.35 Admittedly, Socrates’ use of “the things that are” at 382b is strange. Nevertheless, it is possible to use descriptive language to talk about normative matters. Suppose, for instance, that the world is such that one ought to instantiate and promote goodness. Now suppose that it is also a fact of the world that certain dispositions and actions instantiate and promote goodness. If this is true, then there is a set of possible actions and dispositions that instantiate and promote goodness, and it is possible to be ignorant about this set of things. Consi