Abstract
Xen through the Dom0 to manage and control other guest domains to enhance the utilization and efficiency of resources, but it also introduces new security risks. This paper presents a kernel-module-based model for active and passive coexistence attacks in the Xen virtualization environment. The active attack mode of VirtAPCA can destroy all network-based services in Dom0, and the passive mode offers the ability to steal guest domain user's privacy information. VirtAPCA has hidden self-protection features that evade system checking and deletion. Experiments show that the model can successfully perform the attack task. The principles behind VirtAPCA allows it to scale to other virtualization environments such as KVM.
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