Violent Crime: Does Social Capital Matter?

Abstract

This paper examines empirically the effect of some commonly used indicators of social capital, such as the prevalence of trust on community members and the participation in voluntary secular and religious organizations, on the incidence of violent crimes. This is a cross-country study whose basic sample consists of 39 developed and developing countries and whose dependent variable is the national intentional homicide rate. The paper identifies and deals with three challenges in the empirical estimation of the effect of social capital on the incidence of violent crimes. The omittedvariable problem is dealt with by including income inequality and economic growth as additional determinants of a country’s violent crime rate. The joint endogeneity (or reverse-causation) problem is accounted for by using instrumental variables for social capital in the crime regression. The specificity problem, that is the potentially opposite effects of group-specific and society-wide social capital, is noted and addressed only indirectly by emphasizing the results applied to the social capital indicators that have application for society as a whole. The main result of the paper is that only the component of social capital measured by trust on community members has the effect of reducing the incidence of violent crimes. The results regarding measures of other indicators of social capital are rather unclear. This may be due to a combination of limited samples, inability to fully control for reverse causation, and most likely, the opposite effects that society-wide and group-specific social capital may have on violent crime. ∗ Lederman and Menendez are economists with the Office of the Chief Economist for Latin America and the Caribbean of the World Bank. Loayza is a senior economist with the research department of the Central Bank of Chile, and he is currently on leave from the Development Economics Research Group of the World Bank. The opinions expressed herein should not be attributed to the World Bank. The authors are grateful to Ed Glaeser, Jeff Grogger, Gale Johnson, Sanjay Marwah, Steve Messner, Nicholas Sambanis, and an anonymous referee for invaluable comments and suggestions. The authors are responsible for any remaining errors.