Abstract
The chapter begins by sketching out why Henry of Ghent nevertheless holds that metaphysics is the first and fundamental scientific discipline and how, according to him, metaphysics is independent of the kind of inquiry into material changeable objects that medieval philosophers consider as the domain of tphysicst. This way one can expect to get some sort of answer as to whether metaphysics is possible at all. The remaining sections of the contribution all deal in one way or another with the question of how metaphysical knowledge is possible for Henry. According to Aristotle's account in the Posterior Analytics, knowledge in the strict sense (scientia) is about the necessary properties and parts of its subject-matter. Finally, it adds some remarks about the way in which God is, according to Henry of Ghent, the object of metaphysical knowledge. Keywords: Aristotle; God; Henry of Ghent; knowledge; metaphysics; physics; Posterior Analytics; scientia
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